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Since World War II, the Philippines has confronted threats from communist 
insurgents, Muslim secessionists, and a few other agitators.  Recently, however, a new 
threat has emerged-- this time coming from a terrorist organization known as the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG).  Although the ASG is a relatively small group, it has wrought great 
injury to the Philippine image as of late.  Common among the groups presenting a threat 
to internal security are that their strategies and tactics tend to be unconventional and 
asymmetric.   
This thesis seeks to determine how special operations can improve the AFP’s 
capability to address internal security threats.  The study begins by examining the 
security environments in which the AFP currently operates, and then proceeds to study 
emerging security environments in which it will likely operate.  The current special 
operations capability of the AFP is explored and assessed, while inquiring whether it 
needs enhancing.  Case studies of past AFP special operations against groups which 
posed major internal threats are analyzed to determine whether or not the doctrine and 
strategy of the AFP was correct, especially regarding its use of Special Operations Forces 
(SOF).  Furthermore, this study considers the United States (U.S.) model for special 
operations, namely the U.S. Special Operations Forces, in proposing a special operations 
strategy for the AFP that is feasible, suitable, and sustainable.  It is suggested that such an 
examination will produce a strategy that is relevant, adaptable, and responsive to dealing 
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A. BACKGROUND  
Since its founding in 1935, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has been 
forced to confront various threats to its existence as a sovereign and democratic nation.  
During the post-World War II period, the AFP has had to confront the Communist-led 
Hukbalahap, also called the “Huk rebels.”  The Huk rebels were the forerunners of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), founded in 1968 by a combination of 
remnants of the Huk rebels and new radicals. 
Two decades later, in the early 1970s, the AFP was again forced to confront a 
major challenge to upholding the government’s integrity and sovereignty, this time 
presented by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)1, a Muslim secessionist group 
in the southern Philippines.  In 2000, the AFP faced another threat posed by a Muslim 
separatist movement, this time in central Mindanao by a group called the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), a break-away faction of MNLF2.  The 1980’s saw the AFP 
advance significantly in the government’s campaign against counterinsurgencies.  
Finally, in the early 1990’s, the AFP observed the emergence of a new radical Islamic 
terrorist organization, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). 
The emergence of the ASG has caught the attention of both political and military 
leaders of the Philippines.  The ASG conducts many kinds of terrorist actions, including 
bombing and kidnapping for ransom, targeting both locals and internationals 
noncombatants.  Thus, the AFP leadership had shifted its focus to combat the threat 
posed by the ASG because of the damage that the ASG could potentially inflict upon the 
Philippine government.  Recently, the armed forces have conducted numerous hostage 
rescue missions in territories held by the terrorist forces.  For instance, in the early 
                                                 
1 The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded in the 1960s. Its aim is to establish Moro 
autonomy in the southern Philippines.  The MNLF mounted an offensive against the Philippine government 
in 1972.  After more than two decades of fighting, its leader, Nur Misuari, signed a peace agreement with 
the government in 1996.  Misuari then became the governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM).  In 2001, Misuari was removed as governor on charges of graft and corruption.  
Thereafter, loyal followers of Misuari formed the Misuari Renegade Group (MRG). 
2 The MILF was established in 1978 after some MNLF fighters were upset with Nur Misuari’s 
leadership.  The late Hasim Salamat became its first leader.  The current leader is Alraj Murad. 
2 
1990’s, the Philippine Marines seized the ASG main camp, Al-Madinah, resulting in the 
safe recovery of hostages, Anthony Biel and Father Bernardo Blanco (a Spanish priest).  
Later, the Marines were able to free Filipino priest, Father Cirilo Nacorda, and American 
national, Jeffrey Schillings, in a subsequent hostage rescue operation.  Furthermore, in 
2002, a U.S. assisted joint task force from the Army, Navy, and Marines rescued, Gracia 
Burnham, an American national, from the hands of the ASG.  In a follow up operation to 
this most recent crisis, Abu Sabaya, the leader in charge of the terrorist group who 
abducted the hostages was killed by the Philippine Naval Special Warfare Group 
(NSWG). 
These recent accomplishments are significant because, they not only 
demonstrated the capability of the AFP to conduct special operations, but also because 
they showed the need to enhance the AFP’s capabilities to engage in this kind of warfare.  
The AFP has a long and distinguished history in fighting according to irregular warfare 
tactics.  As discussed previously, in this century the Philippines has provided a supportive 
home for the development of special operations units.  As early as the late 1940’s, during 
the campaign against the Huk rebels, the AFP has engaged in special operations against 
its enemy. This was also evidenced by the Force X raid in 1948.   
B. PURPOSE 
Threats to internal security remain the number one priority of the Philippine 
government, and particularly of the AFP.  The CPP has waged an insurgency against the 
government for over 35 years.  The MILF secessionists and ASG terrorists continue to 
pose a major security concern.  In this thesis it will be argued that: 1) a correct use of 
special operations can improve the AFP’s capability to address internal security threats 
and 2) the conduct of special operations in the past has not been maximally effective.  
Furthermore, the study will propose a special operations scheme for the AFP that is 
feasible, suitable, and sustainable to the unique security environment in which the 
Philippine government exists.   
C. RELEVANCE 
A majority of the literature dealing with special operations in the Philippines 
focuses primarily on the capabilities of the different branches of its armed forces.  
Whereas many of these studies have documented well the capabilities and utility of some 
3 
of the special units, they have limited themselves to analyzing only tactical and 
operational levels.  On the other hand, the present study provides insights into the 
strategic use of special operations in combating the internal security threats, while also 
examining other security challenges currently being faced by the Philippine government 
(as well as threats it will likely have to face in the future).  The intent of the study is 
threefold: 1) to validate current doctrines and programs of the AFP in the field of special 
operations, 2) to highlight the different activities under special operations which the AFP 
leadership should consider in future endeavors and 3) to demonstrate to the AFP the 
critical nature of special operations in facing the dangers posed by current and future 
threats to the security environment.   
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
The study will limit its examination to the following: 1) the current and future 
security environments in the Philippines, 2) environments in which its armed forces are 
likely to be called upon to operate; 3) specific, local, internal security threats (i.e., the 
Local Communist Movement (LCM), the Southern Philippines Separatist Group (SPSG), 
and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); and finally, 4) the current status of the AFP’s 
capabilities with regard to special operations, as seen from the perspective of the AFP. 
Selected, unclassified case studies of past AFP missions will be examined in order 
to help determine some of the recurring problems that have marred the success of past 
special operations.  These serve to highlight the impact of such operations on the threats 
posed by groups employing unconventional methods.  
Finally, this study carefully considers a successful model for special operations--
the U.S. Special Operations Forces--to propose an operations system for the Philippines 
that is feasible, suitable, and applicable to the unique Philippine situation.  
E. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The principal method for achieving the aims of this study is to analyze 
experiences gathered from past cases.  Therefore, the study will examine three cases 
where special operations of the AFP were used in fighting against different groups that 
posed a threat to the Philippine government, including a case where the AFP engaged the 
Hukbalahap (Huks), Communist-inspired insurgents, and two cases in which the AFP 
fought the radical Muslim Islamist terrorist group, ASG. 
4 
Although the cases are not large in scale or definitive in their execution, 
nonetheless they are sufficiently useful in devising plausible conclusions.  The AFP 
combat operations examined here were carefully selected and are significant based on 
their strategic nature.  The diverse settings of these combat operations permit 
comparisons between the successes and failures that have occurred over time, extending 
from the Huk campaign of the 1940’s, to the ASG of today.  The comparison of military 
actions against the groups that have posed a threat to Philippine national security serves 
to reinforce the usefulness of this study.  
Each of the cases, presented in Chapter V, reviews past action, dividing its 
analysis into two sections: 1) a synopsis of the background, provided in the form of a 
narrative of the salient events and 2) a brief  discussion and observations about what can 
be learned from the case.   
F. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II will examine the current security environment in the Philippines, 
including an assessment of the main groups posing a threat, and an estimate of the future 
security landscape in the Philippines.  Based on the information generated by this 
examination, Chapter II will also analyze the relevance of special operations to the AFP.  
Chapter III, in order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the study, will 
then present a description of the AFP’s special operations units, as well as its current 
capabilities.  Chapter IV will provide insight into the U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) which serves as a good paradigm to propose a special operations strategy for the 
AFP that is feasible, suitable and sustainable.  Next, Chapter V will analyze three earlier 
cases where the AFP conducted special operations in order to determine whether the 
doctrine and strategy of the AFP has been effective in the past. 
The last chapter of the study, Chapter VI, provides answers to the research 
questions proposed in this study: 
1) Are special operations relevant to the internal security operations of the 
AFP? 
2) Is the current special operations capability of the AFP adequate to deal 
with the internal security threats posed by certain groups?  
5 
3) Did special operations play a key role in past AFP operations?  
4) Were special operations forces used effectively in past operations? 
5) How can the AFP improve its special operations capabilities to most 
effectively deal with the internal security threats?   
6) What type of special operations strategy is most feasible, suitable, and 
sustainable for the AFP in order to be maximally relevant, adaptable, and responsive to 
the security environment of the Philippines?  
G. SPECIAL OPERATIONS DEFINED 
Because the scope of special operations tends to encompass such a broad range of 
practices, it is difficult to define “special operations” in precise terms.  As a result, in the 
literature, definitions have often been vague and under-inclusive.  However, special 
operations is frequently associated with missions involving the following: raids, 
reconnaissance, demolitions, sabotage and assassinations, counter-terrorism, training and 
organizing indigenous forces, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, covert 
operations, and the like.  The danger in a proffering a definition that might be both vague 
and under-inclusive is that it provides little meaningful guidance to understanding the 
term.  On the other hand, if the definition is too rigid and narrowly focused, it 
unnecessarily hinders imagination in conducting special operations.  In efforts to avoid 
either danger, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has broadly defined special 
operations as: 
Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or 
economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no 
broad conventional requirement.  These operations often require covert, 
clandestine, or low visibility capabilities.  Special operations are 
applicable across the range of military operations.  They can be conducted 
independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or 
other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or 
by indigenous or surrogate forces.  Special operations differ from 
conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, 
operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly 
support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 
indigenous assets.3 
                                                 
3 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) 
6 
This comprehensive definition is then added to by the U.S. Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) when it says that special operations encompass the use of small 
units, in direct or indirect military actions, that are focused on strategic or operational 
objectives.  Additionally, it says, special operations often require units having a 
combination of specialized personnel, equipment, training, or tactics that exceeds the 
routine capabilities of conventional military forces.  In light of the foregoing, the 
Philippine Navy Manual, Philippine Marine Corps Special Operations (PNM3-27), 
defines special operations as “operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and 
organized forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national objectives.”4   
According to Maurice Tugwell and David Charters, “Special operations are small, 
clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox, frequently high-risk in nature, 
undertaken to achieve political or military objectives in support of foreign policy.”5  This 
definition will be used in the present study because it captures six of the significant 
elements most often mentioned as being part of special operations, namely that they tend 
to: 1) be small in scale, 2) be clandestine, 3) be either covert or overt, 4) be unorthodox, 
5) be high-risk, 6) have significant political and/or military objectives, and 6) be 
supportive of both foreign and/or national objectives6. 
H. STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
This study focuses on the strategic use of special operations and special 
operations forces.  According to Colin Gray7, the term, “strategic use” can be defined as, 
“the contribution of a particular kind of military activity to the course and outcome of an 
entire conflict.”8  Gray categorized several strategic utilities of special operations, among 
                                                 
 
4 Philippine Navy Manual Marine Special Operations (PNM3-27).  The definition proceed to state that 
“special operations can be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either 
inappropriate or infeasible during periods of peace or hostilities.  These include operations launched and 
sustained from the sea.”   
5 Gray, C. (1998). Explorations in Strategy. Westport, CT: Praeger. (p. 145). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Colin Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 
UK. He worked in the U.S. for 17 years, where he was the founding president of a defense-oriented 
Washington think tank, the National Institute for Public Policy. He held a presidential appointment for five 
years in the Reagan administration, and was the recipient of the Distinguished Public Service Award from 
the US Navy. (NPS, Library) 
8 Gray, C. (1988). Explorations in Strategy. Westport, CT: Praeger. (p. 165). 
7 
which are: economy of force, expansion of choice, innovation, morale, reassurance, 
humiliation of the enemy, shaping the future, showcasing competence, and control of 
escalation.9  In this study, the first two categories, namely economy of force and 
expansion of choice, are the most important.  On the one hand, economy of force pertains 
to the achievement of significant results with only a limited use of forces.  This is 
important because it is commonly recognized that a primary military virtue is to achieve 
maximum results with only a minimum of effort.  On the other hand, expansion of choice 
refers to the tendency of special operations to expand the options available to political 
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II. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The most active and significant threats to the Philippine’s national security are 
posed by those who threaten its internal security.  The government, particularly the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), is faced with three major internal security 
threats: the Local Communist Movement, or LCM, the Southern Philippines Secessionist 
Group, or SPSG, and the Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG.  The continued existence of these 
terrorist groups has brought great damage to the country, in terms of stresses to its 
financial status, breaches in its national security, and injury to its national prestige.  The 
AFP has been given the mission of responding to threats to the Philippine internal 
security.  It has been a primary objective of the AFP to defeat these adversaries.   
Communist-inspired insurgencies pose the greatest security threat to the 
Philippine’s national security because they tend to be larger in scope than those posed by 
Muslim extremist groups---groups usually tied to foreign terrorist networks.  The renewal 
of Communist-led insurgencies has resulted in the AFP’s being given the primary 
responsibility for heading up the Internal Security Operations, or ISO (prior to this, it had 
been the domain of the Philippine National Police [PNP]).10 As of 2002, the LCM 
strength was placed at 9,257 men equipped with 6,126 firearms.  The number of affected 
barangays, or villages, was approximately 2,394, about 6% of the 42,000 barangays 
nationwide.  The number of guerrilla fronts was placed at 105 nationwide.11   
Aside from internal threats from the LCM, there are several other security 
challenges looming on the horizon for the Philippines. Among these are: other forms of 
terrorism, external threats to territorial integrity, threats to regional peace and stability, 
security threats that are both transnational and nontraditional, the safety and security of 
Overseas Filipino Investors (OFI), and dangers to national economic development.   
 
                                                 
10 Republic Act 8551 or The PNP Reform and Reorganization Law returns the primary responsibility 
for counterinsurgency to the AFP.  It superseded RA 6975, which transferred the responsibility of internal 
security to the Department of Interior and Local Government and Philippine National Police. 
11 AFP Letter of Instruction 11-2003, Contingency Plan (Pisces “Bravo”). Undated. 
10 
B. PHILIPPINE INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT GROUPS  
1. The Local Communist Movement (LCM) 
Communists have been waging a Maoist type insurgency in the Philippines for 
over 35 years and pose a greater security threat to the Philippines than do the many 
Muslim secessionist and terrorist groups that are often tied to foreign subversive 
networks.  The Communist Party of the Philippines, or CPP, and its armed guerrilla 
wing- (8,600-strong New People’s Army, or NPA), are considered to be the main security 
threat to the peace and security of the Philippines because of its nationwide presence and 
advanced capability to mount an armed rebellion.  Aside from pursuing an armed 
struggle, the CPP maximizes their so-called “legal struggle” by using many different 
front organizations under its umbrella front, the National Democratic Front, or NDF, to 
organize, agitate the populace.  Such front organizations accomplish CPP goals by 
“working” closely with the government while keeping clandestine ties to the rebels.  
Following Chinese and Vietnamese model, the CPP, the NPA, and the NDF, acting 
together, wages a protracted struggle by seizing political power.  They do this by 
encircling the cities from the countryside with armed guerrillas.  The CPP/NPA complex 
executes this armed struggle, while establishing- “mass base”12 areas in the countryside, 
as well as organizing mass movements in urban centers to support and sustain the 
organization.  
Despite some set backs in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the CPP/ NPA/ NDF 
conglomerate continues to conduct political, economic, social, and psychological 
activities to drive a wedge between the people and the government.  Communist 
guerrillas have been able to infiltrate many legitimate organizations, such as those in 
labor, those in student/ youth groups, and those in urban poor sectors, and stay involved 
in activities to build a united-front.  The Communist Party is responsible for politicizing, 
agitating, and organizing the aforementioned sectors to participate in CPP-initiated 
rallies, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of protest actions against the government.  
                                                 
12 Guerrilla mass base areas are areas in the countryside consisting of several barangays or villages, 
covering two or more towns or provinces, where guerrilla units have established their control and influence 
through their own mass organizations and local organs of political power.  It is also called “influenced” 
areas in the country.  
11 
NPA elements are responsible for confronting the AFP, and for protecting guerrilla 
members, their movements, and supporters.  The NDF is the legal front organization for 
the CPP.13   
Although the LCM split in the mid-1990’s into two main groups—1) “the 
Reaffirmist,” or the mainstream CPP/NPA/NDF, and 2) the new Rejectionist Faction-- 
both factions share a common strategic objective, namely: seizing political power and 
establishing a Communist-ruled government.  In recent years, e.g., when it took 
advantage of the renewed conflict in Mindanao, the LCM has seen a resurgence in terms 
of the number of guerrilla fighters, firearms, mass bases, and guerrilla fronts.14  In 
response to the growing number of insurgents, the AFP has made it a goal to dismantle a 
total of 101 guerrilla fronts nationwide in the next five years.15  In 2002, alone, the AFP 
had to clear 400 LCM-affected barangays, suggesting that the CPP/NPA has grown 
considerably in recent years.    
The NPA is capable of conducting terrorist actions which are both selective and 
discriminate, such as liquidation, murder, assassination, bombing, kidnapping for ransom, 
intimidation and coercion, arson, and extortion.  All activities are conducted in order to 
gain control over people and their areas of operation.  The NPA is also able to conduct 
many other activities, including harassment, raids, and ambushes against government 
forces and military targets, as evidenced by three separate incidents: 1) on February 6, 
2004 against CAA patrol bases in Limos, Pinukpok, Kalinga, 2) on February 28, 2004 
against the Echo Company, 77th Infantry Battalion in Poswoy, Balbalan, Kalinga, and  3) 
on March 1, 2004 in the ambush against Army elements in Tamban Tinambac, 
                                                 
13 The prime function of the NDF is to win the over all possible allies to totally isolate the ruling 
regime and to give direct and indirect support to the armed struggle being waged by the NPA in the 
countryside.  The NDF also forms the nucleus of the provisional coalition government that will assume 
governmental functions once the revolution succeeds. (Corpuz, 1989, p. 57).  
14 Guerrilla Front is a politico-military-geographical unit of the CPP/NPA which consists of: 1) a 
political organization usually made up of a front committee, with districts, sections, and barrio 
revolutionary committees under it; 2) a military organization made up of a regular mobile force or forces 
varying in size from platoon up to several companies, armed propaganda teams, and local militias; 3) a 
front territory or AOR consisting of several municipalities.  Most of these guerrilla fronts are located along 
provincial boundaries with mountainous/forested terrain, but there are some which are located in the plains, 
along coastlines, and in depressed areas in urban centers. (Corpuz, 1989, p. 139). 
15 AFP 1st Quarter CY 2004 Internal Security Operations Assessment Briefing on April 16, 2004. 
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Camarines Sur.16  Guerrilla operations, such as these, are inevitably aimed at weakening 
the government’s security forces, eventually in order to destroy them, and with them, the 
political will of the people. 
Because of the inclusion of the LCM on the current U.S. terrorist watch list, its 
external financial support has been dwindling.  Thus, the insurgents have stepped-up their 
campaign of extortion in the form of their “revolutionary tax,”17 levied from business 
establishments in the cities and countryside to generate much needed funds.  During the 
last national elections, for instance, guerrillas demanded exorbitant amounts of money 
from the candidates in exchange for being allowed to campaign in rebel controlled areas.  
Additionally, in order to sustain and bolster their declining ranks, the Communist 
guerrillas have resorted to the recruiting of minors.   
Despite the fact that LCM has been added to the U.S. terrorist list, the Philippine 
government continues to pursue peace talks with CPP.  The CPP, on its latest bid to 
acquire greater strength, has demanded that they be taken off the list before pursuing 
peace talks.  The Philippine military, however, has found fresh evidence of growing links 
between the CPP and foreign terrorist organizations, allegations that the CPP has 
vehemently denied.  Thus, in October 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo has ordered a 
reassessment of the government’s strategy in addressing the 35-year-old insurgency.18   
In response, a spokesman of the Communist rebels said, “The rebels no longer believe the 
government was serious in pursuing a political settlement to the insurgency that has 
claimed thousands of lives.”19   
2. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
The MILF is a breakaway faction of the Moro National Liberation Front, or 
MNLF.  The MILF is now the main entity threatening the Philippine’s internal security in 
                                                 
16 AFP 1st Quarter CY 2004 Internal Security Operations Assessment Briefing on April 16, 2004. 
17 The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has placed damage to properties caused by the New 
People’s Army (NPA) in Western Visayas owned by private corporations that have refused to pay 
revolutionary taxes from January to August of 2004 to be P42 million. It represents almost one-third of the 
P66.2 million worth of properties destroyed by the rebel group nationwide. 
(http://www.philstar.com/philstar/NEWS200409079904.htm) 
18 Dalangin-Fernandez, L. (2004). Arroyo: RP still a U.S. Ally in War vs Communists, Terrorists. 
Inquirer. Retrieved October 20, 2004, from http://news.inq7.net/top/index.php?index=1&story_id=15531 
19 Ibid.  
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central and western Mindanao (hence, the MILF is also known as the “Southern 
Philippines Secessionist Group,” or SPSG).  It was formed in 1978 by the late Hashim 
Salamat and other disgruntled Central Committee members who left the mainstream 
MNLF.  Its goal is to establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao.  Towards the 
achievement of this goal, the MILF has outlined a four-point program, namely: 1) 
instigating military offensives, 2) intensifying diplomatic offensives, 3) sustaining mass 
actions, and 4) pursuing negotiations with the government.20  The struggle, however, has 
largely been confined to central Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Maguindanao, 
-Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, and North Cotabato.   
In order to sustain its goal of building a Muslim state, the MILF, like the other 
threat groups, have carried out kidnap-for-ransom and extortion activities ranging from 
soliciting funds support from local populations laboring to get the support of some 
international Islamic organizations.  Unlike the CPP/NPA, however, the MILF’s armed 
division, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), has engaged government forces 
in “quasi-conventional” warfare.  Due to a military offensive in 2000 that eventuated in 
the destruction of most of its camps, including Camp Abubakar (the main headquarters of 
the MILF), the MILF has abandoned its more conventional strategies in favor of 
conducting guerrilla warfare.  The BIAF, though numbering only in the thousands, is still 
capable of conducting small-scale raids, ambushes and harassments outside its area of 
operations.   
The MILF has also been linked to international terrorist organization in the past.  
In the late 1990, some foreign terrorists of unknown nationalities were killed during an 
assault on Army Camp Awang in Cotabato, together with MILF fighters. The MILF has 
also been blamed for a series of kidnappings and killings of foreign hostages in recent 
years.  For example, in October 2001 MILF guerrillas seized Italian priest Guiseppe 
Pierantoni, while he was officiating at a mass near the town of Dimataling in 
Mindanao.21  He was freed six months later after extensive government negotiations, 
allegedly in exchange for ransom.  Lately, the AFP has found evidence of growing links 
                                                 
20 National Internal Security Plan dated 2002. 
21 Ortega, R. & Rosauro, R. (2004). Italian Abducted in Lanao del Norte. Retrieved on November 1, 
2004 from http://news.inq7.net/top/index.php?index=1&story_id=17618.  
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between the MILF and the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiya, or JI.  Additionally, there 
are growing concerns over reports of JI terrorists undergoing training inside MILF 
camps.  
Despite these developments, the MILF is expected to engage the Philippine 
government in extensive peace negotiations22, even while continuing to build-up its 
manpower and logistics, just as it has done in the past.  In November 2004, for example, 
an Italian, non-government organization worker was abducted by armed men and was 
reportedly taken to an MILF-controlled area.23  Moreover, the MILF is expected to 
exploit the peace process by eliciting widespread sympathy and international recognition 
of its right to exist as an independent, Islamic state in Mindanao.  Although the MILF 
threat is concentrated in central Mindanao, it has become a major concern regarding the 
internal security of the entire country due to its substantial popular support and continued 
aid from foreign Islamic organization and personalities.  In terms of its membership and 
firepower, the strength of the MILF has also risen. As of this writing, MILF armed 
fighters number in the thousands. 
3. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)  
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is also a major security concern primarily due to 
its kidnap-for-ransom tactics and other terrorist activities.  Although a relatively small 
group, the ASG has wrought more damage to the country’s image as of late than any 
other group.  The threat posed by locally based terrorism is well illustrated by the ASG. 
For example, it is responsible for numerous raids and kidnappings, such as those in the 
Sipadan, Malaysia and the Dos Palmas Beach Resort, Palawan incidents24, all of which 
have been international concerns.  
The members of the ASG are former MNLF fighters who left the organization 
after it entered into peace negotiations with the Philippine government.  Furthermore, the 
core members of the ASG are veterans of the Afghan War, where they had fought as 
                                                 
22 The MILF has been waging a rebellion since 1978, but has signed a truce with the Philippine 
government and is to begin formal peace talks in late 2004. 
23 Ortega, R. & Rosauro, R. (2004). Italian Abducted in Lanao del Norte. Retrieved on November 1, 
2004 from http://news.inq7.net/top/index.php?index=1&story_id=17618. 
24 In 2000 and 2001, ASG raided resorts in Sipadan, Malaysia and Palawan, Philippines, respectively. 
The group kidnapped foreign tourists and locals and brought them to their jungle hideouts in Southern 
Philippines. The ASG received large ransom payments for releasing the foreign and Filipino hostages. 
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mujahadeens against the Soviets, after having been motivated by extremist Islamic 
teachings while residing in the Middle East.  In the beginning of its existence, the ASG 
used religion as its driving force.  Its aim was to propagate Muslim fundamentalism, with 
a main thrust of establishing an Islamic state in the southern Philippines.  This had been 
the vision of its charismatic founder, the late Abdurajak Janjalani, who was killed in late 
1990’s.  
The ASG is now a lawless, bandit group (labeled terrorists by the government), 
claiming Islamic, theocratic objectives.  In 1998, after the government had killed 
Abdurajak Janjalani, the organization was not only brought to the verge of disintegration, 
but also lost its ideological direction. Thus, the ASF has slowly deteriorated into a group 
of “terrorist bandits” who were seemingly content with collecting ransom money from 
kidnapped victims, and other criminal activities.25  However, the ASG continues to exert 
a broad influence and enjoy support in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Zamboanga del 
Sur, Zamoanga del Norte, and Sarangani.   
The ASG resorts to terrorist tactics as its strategy such as kidnapping-for-ransom, 
executing civilians, and bombings. This is done in order to sow fear among the people so 
that the ASG can wield authority and maintain control in areas in which they operate. The 
ransom money collected from previous kidnapping activities was often used, not only to 
procure modern communications equipment, other gear, and weapons, but also to buy the 
loyalty of the populace.  
Additionally, of major concern has been the ASG’s reported close connections 
with convicted terrorist, Ramzi Yousef, and its alleged links with the al Qaeda network. 
The latter possibility has been raised because of ASG’s close association with Islamic 
NGOs (and other front business firms) established by Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, a 
brother-in-law of Osama Bin Ladin.   
Although its strength has been greatly reduced to about 240 fighters from a peak 
of 1,200, the ASG remains a threat in southern Mindanao.  The ASG continues to project 
an image of strength and invincibility, despite numerous setbacks incurred from intensive 
                                                 
25 Philippine Marine Corps. (2002). Field handout: Doctrinal Extract for the ASG, (FH02A1). Manila: 
PMC. (p. 12). 
16 
government operations.  Despite these AFP successes, ASG special operations groups 
continue to lurk in several urban centers, and to conduct surprise terror attacks against 
civilian and military targets.  According to Wayne Downing, “the ASG serves as a 
cautionary tale of how independent, networked groups can quickly reconstitute following 
a setback.”26  Even after the killing of one of its top leaders, Abu Sabaya, in June 2002 by 
a combined Filipino/U.S. operation, the ASG has seemed to recover. Lastly, the ASG 
continues to enjoy a great degree of support from the local Muslim population, even 
though many in southern Philippine communities do not agree with the means by which 
the ASG attains its goal.   
C. CHALLENGES AND OTHER CONCERNS 
1. International Terrorism 
As a society, Filipinos have not been spared from the horrors of terrorism.  
International terrorism could easily spill over into the region and could, thereby, become 
the greatest security challenge the country has to face in the future.  Al Qaeda has alledly 
already provided equipment and training assistance to both the MILF and the ASG.27  
The government blamed Jemaah Islamiya (JI)28 and renegade members of the separatist 
MILF for the bombings of targets throughout the Philippines in 2000 which killed 22 
people, including an overhead railway in Manila.  Moreover, JI was incriminated for a 
car bomb outside the residence of the Philippine envoy to Jakarta, Leonides Caday, in 
August 2000 that severely wounded Caday and his driver.  Furthermore, a captured JI 
bomber, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, confessed to wiring money to Filipino militants who 
used it to buy explosives for the attacks.  Al-Ghozi escaped from a Manila jail in 2003 
but was subsequently killed by the police during a pursuit operation.     
The JI terror attacks in the region might provide the ASG with inspiration in the 
same manner that al Qaeda inspired JI and other international terrorist organizations.  
According to Wayne Downing, “The terrorist groups are taking advantage of freedom of 
                                                 
26 Downing, W. (2003). The Global War on Terrorism: Focusing the National Strategy. Defeating 
Terrorism. Guilford, CT: McGraw Hill. (p. 155).  
27 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission 
Report. New York: W.W Norton & Company. (p. 58). 
28 Jemaah Islamiya is nascent organization headed by Indonesian Islamists which is known to have 
cells in the country as well as in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.  JI is considered the regional chapter 
of al Qaeda.  The Philippine government has reported that there are JI members hiding in the southern 
Philippines. 
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information to increase their geographic reach.”29  Downing argues that ASG and JI have 
been inspired by al Qaeda, becoming al Qaeda franchises by sharing resources, 
information, people, and ideology.  The September 2004 attack by JI on the Australian 
embassy in Jakarta, for example, can be emulated by ASG in Manila at some time in the 
future.  In November of 2004, the Philippine military attacked an alleged terrorist hideout 
where suspected JI and ASG members were meeting.30  Philippine intelligence officials 
claim that renegade Muslim rebels are currently sheltering JI members in their camps in 
the southern Philippines.  Despite recent victories against terrorists, the bomb attack in 
Jakarta clearly indicates that challenges from international terrorist activities are far from 
being over.   
2. Regional Peace and Stability 
Regional peace and stability has been another concern of security forces in the 
Philippines.  Problems that have global ramifications, such as the menace posed by 
radical Islamists, will have a growing impact in the Philippines.  The September 11, 2001 
attacks on the United States had tremendous security implications worldwide.  Al 
Qaeda’s declaration of jihad against the United States has encouraged Muslim Islamic 
groups around the world, including those in Asia, to increase their own terrorist activities 
against the U.S. and its allies.   
The JI bombing incident in Bali and the car bomb attack on the Australian 
embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, also alledly by JI terrorists, have contributed to a 
worsening of the security environment in the region.  After the attack, the JI warned, "It 
is the first of a series of attacks... We advise Australians in Indonesia to leave this country 
or else we will transform it into a cemetery for them."31  Also, JI pressured the Australian 
government to withdraw its troops from Iraq, just as the Iraqi insurgents had done to the 
Philippine government earlier.  JI vowed more attacks of greater magnitude if their 
demand was not met: “We will deal them many painful blows. The lines of booby-
                                                 
29 Downing, W. (2003). The Global War on Terrorism: Focusing the National Strategy. Defeating 
Terrorism. Guilford, CT: McGraw Hill. (p. 151). 
30 Unson, J. (2004). Military Pounds JI-Abu Meet; 10 Killed. Retrieved on November 20, 2004 from 
http://www.philstar.com/philstar/News200411210404.htm. 
31 Retrieved on September 10, 2004 from  http://www.philstar.com/philstar/News200409110401.htm.  
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trapped cars will have no end,"32  The recent clashes between Thai Muslim extremists 
with alleged ties to JI  and the Royal Thai military in southern Thailand suggests that the 
security situation is worsening.  Indonesia, the largest Muslim state in the region, is a 
potential safe haven and training sites for the members of al Qaeda cells.  The Philippines 
had been reported to have 30-50 JI operatives training in southern provinces coming in 
through its “southern backdoors.”33    
Equally important, the situation on the Korean peninsula, the dispute in the 
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)34, and the China-Taiwan conflict all present potential 
flashpoints for military conflict in the region.  Not too long ago in the 1990’s, the 
Indonesian government faced secessionist and sectarian violence problem of its own in 
Aceh and East Timor.   
3. Transnational, Nontraditional Security Threats 
Another security concern that can have great impacts on both the security 
environment and the nation’s socio-economic stability is transnational and non-traditional 
threats, such as drugs and narco-terrorism, international and transnational organized 
crimes, smuggling, money laundering, piracy, cyber and e-commerce crimes, and other 
forms of illegal competition in economic sphere.  The significance of these threats tends 
to be relative with the other challenges already discussed.  The Philippine National Police 
is the lead agency in addressing these problems.  The threat groups in this category, 
however, usually over-extend the capabilities of the Philippine police forces.  Organized 
crime groups present the foremost formidable challenge to maintaining peace and order 
with the number of powerful domestic and international syndicate groups rising in recent 
years.  Transnational, nontraditional threats are difficult to find, reach, and neutralize.  
The profitability of transnational crimes such as piracy, drug trafficking, smuggling, etc. 
have had a tremendous impact on the national economy and the Philippines’ socio-
political stability.  The country loses billions of pesos annually to these groups.                                                     
32 Retrieved on September 10, 2004 from  http://www.philstar.com/philstar/News200409110401.htm.  
33 Southern Philippines border is very vast which the AFP cannot totally protect from intruders, 
smugglers, pirates, etc. The Philippine Navy has limited patrol crafts and few scout airplanes. Most of its 
assets are utilized in counterinsurgency operations.  
34 Kalayaan Island Group are disputed group of approximately 100 reefs and islets in the South China 
Sea. They are part of the South China Sea Islands. They are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and 
potentially by gas and oil deposits. Other claimant countries include: China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
and Brunei. All claimants have security outposts in some islands they have occupied except for Brunei.  
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4. Safety and Security of Filipinos Abroad 
The Filipino’s quest for a better life for his/her family has led many take up 
residence in distant places throughout the world, including the Middle East.  To the 
present date, the Philippines has a total of over a million Overseas Filipino Investors 
(OFIs).35  Together, the OFIs remit much needed foreign currency to the Philippines, an 
amount estimated to exceed a billion U.S. dollars of their contribution to the economic 
well being of the country is so tremendous, the government its required to seek the safety 
and security of not only OFIs, but also other Filipinos working abroad.  Philippine 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has emphasized the government’s commitment to 
safeguarding their security abroad.  For example, the Philippine government pulled out its 
50-man troop contingent from Iraq for exchange to the freedom of a Filipino OFI who 
was kidnapped by Iraqi insurgents.    
5. Threats to Territorial Integrity 
External threats to the Philippine’s territorial integrity have always been present, 
primarily because of the country’s strategic location along the vital sea-lanes of the South 
China Sea, a major trade route and where many countries’ military forces pass through.  
The country also provides a strategic post for maintaining a military presence power in 
the Pacific and Indian Ocean.   
A dispute over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)36 appears far from being 
resolved, as different countries lay claim to the KIG.  China’s incursions, including its 
construction of structures on Mischief Reef in the mid 1990’s added more fuel to the 
existing volatility of the situation. In 1998, tensions increased further when China 
renovated previously built structures and proceeded to build new, more permanent ones.  
then built new more permanent ones.  Another threat to Philippine territorial integrity is 
the overlapping claims over the Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ, with Taiwan, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia.  Although the prospect of an attack or invasion is remote, the 
possibility of intrusions into national territory remains an immediate concern of the 
country.  
                                                 
35 According to the Philippine National Statistics Office, there are a total 1,056,000 OFI as of year 
2002 survey. There around 285, 000 OFI in Saudi Arabia alone as of 1999 survey.  (Source: 
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/datasof.html. Retrieved on October 20, 2004)    
36 Among the other claimant countries are Brunei, China, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
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D. THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Defeating the internal security threats involves a comprehensive solution.  This 
likely implies the application of other elements of national power, such as, political, 
economic, intelligence, information, financial, diplomatic, law enforcement, and military.  
To date, the LCM remains the top priority of the government among the internal threat 
groups.  The insurgents have retained their politico-military capabilities. They also have 
intensified their nationwide recruitment activities in an attempt to influence the masses 
through actions in urban areas and armed struggle in the countryside.   
The NPA will continue to use unconventional means to fight, including using 
guerrilla warfare as a method, if necessary, trying to maintain the conflict at a low 
intensity levels. Their strategy, for the most part, will be to engage the AFP 
asymmetrically.  The NPA will avoid engaging its government forces in conventional or 
positional warfare.  One of their strategies is the adapting of guerrilla warfare tactics into 
mobile warfare situations, often characterized by the absence of fixed battle lines.  They 
will, by all means, continue to strive for control and win the support of the people in 
order to remain in the fight.   
The LCM might present a formidable challenge to the Philippines’ security. But it 
appears to be vulnerable to a concentrated government effort; aimed at decisively 
defeating its main armed groups; dismantling its politico-military infrastructures; 
reestablishing government control and authority in contested areas; and reducing the root 
causes of insurgency through good governance. 
On the other hand, the threat posed by the MILF and ASG appears to be more 
manageable.  After the 2000 AFP offensive in Central Mindanao the MILF’s strength has 
been reduced to a great extent.  MILF activities will continue to be isolated in Muslim 
areas in Central Mindanao where it enjoys a high level of popular support.  Its capability 
to conduct both medium to large-scale offensive and defensive operations against the 
government has been greatly reduced.  However, its recent change of its strategy from 
using semi-conventional tactics to guerrilla warfare tactics will prove more challenging.  
The ongoing truce between the government and MILF combined with the presence of the 
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Malaysian-led, international monitoring team (IMT) makes the prospects of another 
offensive remote in the foreseeable future.     
The ASG had been weakened to a great degree by the death of one of its leaders, 
Abu Sabaya, in an encounter with AFP forces in 2002.  The recent killing and 
neutralization of some of the other leaders and members of terrorist groups has resulted in 
a diminished capability of them doing harm.  The main ASG elements are isolated in the 
southern Philippines particularly in the islands of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.  The 
ASG, however, should not be underestimated—it has access to the funds necessary to 
mobilize and radicalize the people in its strongholds, later exploiting them to the point 
that some join their ranks. The ASG’s links to international terrorist groups like al Qaeda 
and JI increases its potential to grow and build up its capabilities.  The ASG fighters are 
experienced and well-trained.  Most of their leaders have undergone training and combat 
in the Middle East during the Afghan-Soviet War. 
These threat groups continue to embrace the strategy of attrition, as they have 
before.  That is, the different threat groups will continue to become less defined and more 
dispersed.  As a result, it is inevitable that the AFP will employ, and continue to operate, 
at a lower ends of the combat spectrum, specifically, employing Low Intensity Conflict 
(LIC) strategies.  Thus, overall, LIC will become the main security challenge of the 
Philippines.  These conflicts, as Efraim Inbar37 suggests, will be asymmetric, “due to the 
gap in the discernible power of the different threat groups.”38  Because of the weaknesses 
and limited capabilities of the contending adversaries when compared to the strength of 
the government, threat groups will likely continue their strategy of attrition in an attempt 
to exhaust the government over time.  The LCM and SPSG have both employed such 
long-term strategies since their birth.  Therefore, the conflicts they are involved in will 
take more time unless the government is able to negotiate a successful peace initiative.   
Indeed, the future security environment in which the AFP forces will have to 
operate is made even more complex because it is frequently characterized by disorder and 
crises in local, regional, and international scenes.  The threats coming from well-
                                                 
37 Efraim Inbar is a Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ian University and Director of the BESA 
Center for Strategic Studies, as well as Series Editor of the BESA Studies in International Security. 
38 Inbar, E. (2003). Democracies and Small Wars. Portland, OR: Frank Cass. (p. vii). 
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networked terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda and JI, will continue to present a great 
challenge to the AFP.  The new kinds of terrorists are difficult to find and destroy.  The 
threats today are determined more by the fault lines within societies than by the territorial 
boundaries.  The challenges they pose have become transnational, rather than merely 
international, i.e., al Qaeda.  Because these threat groups often perceived that they have 















III. AFP SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY 
Though the AFP possess the capability for special operations, it does not have a 
command and control system at the joint level, i.e., one that oversees the operation of all 
special operations forces (SOF).  There is also currently no doctrine at the joint level to 
guide the units in their operations against the threats of the country.  Therefore, the 
organization, training, and sustaining of SOF are left to the individual major service 
command; its utilization being handled by the geographic unified commands who oversee 
the overall Internal Security Operations (ISO) campaign in its area of responsibility.  
However, similarly, there is no command and control structure that orchestrates SOF 
operations at geographic Unified Commands level.  
This chapter analyzes the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
Special Operations Forces (AFPSOF), as well as its missions.  This chapter will also 
assess the relevance and effectiveness of the current missions, functions, and capabilities 
of AFPSOF. 
A. THE FORCES 
1. Philippine Army Special Operations Force 
The Philippine Army Special Operations Forces consist of the Special Forces 
Regiment (Airborne), the First Scout Ranger Regiment, the Light Reaction Battalion, and 
the Civil Affairs Group.  The Special Forces, Scout Ranger, and Light Reaction units are 
all under the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) of the Philippine Army.  The Civil 
Affairs Group is directly under the control of the Headquarters of the Philippine Army. 
Since its inception in 1962, the Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) (SFRA) has 
continuously grown and evolved from being simply a company, to being a group, then to, 
today, being a regiment.  At present, the unit has approximately 1,200 personnel and is 
organized into a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, three Special Forces 
Battalions with three Special Forces Companies each, and a Special Forces School39. 
Special Forces units are deployed from northern Luzon to southern Mindanao, supporting 
                                                 
39 Headquarters Philippine Army Letter Directive dated February 24, 2004, Subject: Rightsizing of 
SOCOM. 
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AFP area commands and Army divisions. SFRA headquarters, together with the Special 
Forces School, are based in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija.  
Organized primarily to confront the alarming Huk-initiated insurgency problem in 
the country during the late 1940's, the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) evolved from 
being simply a training unit to its present organization.  The First Scout Ranger Regiment 
(FSRR) has approximately 1,800 personnel and is organized into a Headquarters and 
Headquarters Service Company, three Scout Ranger battalions with three Scout Ranger 
companies each, and a Scout Ranger School40.  Considered the most seasoned, 
unconventional fighters in the Philippine Armed Forces, the Scout Ranger units are 
deployed all over the country, their role being to support the AFP area commands and 
Army divisions. FSRR headquarters and the Scout Ranger School are based in Camp 
Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan.  
The Light Reaction Battalion (LRB) is the counter-terrorist unit of the Philippine 
Army. The battalion is composed of Special Forces and Scout Ranger personnel, which 
were trained and organized for counter-terrorist operations.  It has approximately 400 
personnel and is organized into a Headquarters, and Headquarters Company, and three 
Light Reaction companies41.  At present, the unit is under the operational control of the 
AFP Joint Special Operations Group based in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 
The Civil Affairs Group (CAG) of the Philippine Army traces its roots to the 
Public Relations Office (PRO), organized in the 1950’s.  The group was once part of the 
SOCOM, but was placed under the direct control of the Headquarters of the Philippine 
Army in the late 1990’s. CAG has about 130 personnel and is presently organized into a 
Headquarters and Headquarters Service Company, an Information Development Center, a 
Livelihood Training Center, a Civil-Military Operations School, and three Civil Affairs 
Teams.  The group is based in Fort Boinfacio, Makati City, serving as a combat support 
unit for the Philippine Army. 
 
 
                                                 




2. Philippine Navy Special Operations Forces  
The Philippine Navy Special Operations Forces consist of the Naval Special 
Warfare Group and the Force Reconnaissance Battalion.  Although both units are under 
the Philippine Navy, they do not belong to a single, unified command.  Whereas the 
Naval Special Warfare Group is under the Philippine Fleet, the Force Reconnaissance 
Battalion is under the Philippine Marine Corps. 
The Naval Special Warfare Group (NSWG) is the Fleet's unit capable of engaging 
in unconventional warfare and special operations.  The group specializes in sea, air and 
land (SEAL) missions, i.e., operations ranging from reconnaissance, close combat, 
demolition, intelligence and those performed underwater, in support of overall naval 
operations.  The NSWAG has about 400 personnel and is organized into eight company-
sized, Naval Special Warfare Units (NSWU), each deployed along with the Fleet. It also 
has a Headquarters Support Unit and a Naval Special Warfare Training that are based in 
Sangley Point, Cavite City, along with the Headquarters of NSWG.  One NSWU unit is 
attached to the AFP Joint Special Operations Group.  The NSWU consists of three 
operating teams, each capable of operating either as an integral team or as detached 
elements.  
The Force Reconnaissance Battalion (FRBn) started out as the Scout Raider 
Platoon, part of the Weapons Company of the Philippine Marine Battalion in the 1950's.  
In 1972, the Scout Raider Platoon became the 1st Reconnaissance Company, reactivated 
as the 61st Marine (Recon) Company in 1985.  Presently, the FRBn has about 500 
personnel consisting three Recon Companies that are deployed along with the Marine 
Brigades.  The Battalion’s headquarters is based in Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, located 
in the same facility as the Philippine Marine Corps headquarters. 
3. Philippine Air Force Special Operations Forces  
The 710th Special Operations Wing (SPOW) is the unit of the Philippine Air 
Force with special operations capability.  It is has approximately 2,000 personnel 
organized into a Special Operations Group, a Civil Security Group, a Combat Group, a 
Mission Support Squadron, and a Special Operations Combat Support Group.  The 710th 
SPOW headquarters is based in Clark Field, Pampanga, while its operating units are 
strategically deployed in different areas of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao to include 
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Palawan performing Internal Security Operations (ISO) missions.  The Wing is under the 
direct command of the headquarters of the Philippine Air Force. However, its operating 
elements that conduct ISOs are under the operational control of area commands.  One 
squadron of the Special Operations Group, however, is attached to the AFP Joint Special 
Operations Group. 
4. Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Special Operations Group  
Assigned to the Armed Forces of the Philippines counter-terrorism force, the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG) is composed of 
a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, the Light Reaction Battalion of the 
Philippine Army SOCOM, the SEAL Team Company 8 of the NSWG, the 723rd Special 
Operations Squadron of the 710th SPOW, a Special Operations Tactical Helicopter Flight, 
a Special Operations Tactical Airlift Flight, three K-9 teams, and three Explosive 
Ordnance and Disposal (EOD) teams42. JSOG has an approximate total strength of 400 
personnel.  The group is based in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City at the AFP General 
Headquarters.  
B. MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES 
The Philippine Army Special Operations Forces (PASOF) are organized, trained, 
and equipped to perform their principal missions in Internal Security Operations (ISO).  
PASOF is the unconventional combat arm of the AFP, whose mission it is to plan for, 
and conduct Unconventional Warfare and other Special Operations activities in all 
operational environments, including during times of peace, conflict, or war In spite of 
this, PASOF’s missions are dynamic and constantly evolving in response to political-
military considerations and other factors that affect military operations, especially in 
response to the conduct of the ISO.  A change in the national security policy or the 
national military strategy may radically alter the manner in which PASOF conducts its 
missions.  An example of this was seen when the Philippine government’s security 
apparatus shifted its focus from external defenses to ISOs, as well as in the constant shift 
of focus from one campaign to another with regard to local threats. 
In the present setting, where the Philippine insurgency problem has consumed so 
much of the country’s resources, PASOF, considering its ability to function at many 
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different levels and its flexibility in shaping the environment for combat, is one of the 
significant means of resolving the threat posed by insurgencies.  
The mission of the Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) in Internal Security 
Operations environment is to plan for and conduct Direct Action Operations, Special 
Reconnaissance Operations, and Combat Readiness Assessment.  It is also responsible 
for the training of maneuver units in support of the AFP’s mission.43  The First Scout 
Ranger Regiment does its traditional Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance 
operations.  
Direct Action Operations (DAO)44 are normally short-duration operations with a 
limited scope.  They may require a PASOF team to infiltrate a hostile area, attack a 
target, and conduct a preplanned exfiltration, which may include long-term, stay-behind 
operations. The DAO achieves specific, well-defined, time-sensitive results of strategic 
and operational significance. These are often characterized by surgical precision, 
typically leaving smaller “footprints” than conventional operations. As a result, they can 
create greater adverse effects on the enemy than a conventional force of similar size. 
Special Reconnaissance Operations (SRO)45 are reconnaissance and surveillance 
actions conducted by PASOF, either unilaterally, or through other AFP units or 
indigenous forces.  The objective of SRO is to confirm, refute, or obtain – by visual 
observation or other collection methods – information on the capabilities, intentions, and 
activities of an actual or potential enemy.  Reconnaissance missions conducted by 
PASOF normally have objectives that are either strategic or operational in nature, 
although they occur at the tactical level. 
The primary role of the SF in Combat Readiness Assessment and Training 
(CRAT)46 of maneuver units is to provide training assistance tailored to meet the specific 
requirements of the requesting unit. This tailoring serves to improve unit’s readiness for 
                                                 







combat, while improving its effectiveness and efficiency in all types of operations. SF 
personnel train individual soldiers and units of light infantry battalions to fight in combat. 
They possess the technical expertise and knowledge to enhance the soldier’s individual 
skills and shape the unit’s capabilities, discipline, and morale.  
The Special Forces basic unit is a SF team composed of twelve, highly skilled 
soldiers (one officer and 11 enlisted personnel).  It is proficient in performing small-scale 
tactics, training, and in operations that are airborne, waterborne and in jungle or 
mountainous regions.  The team is composed of personnel who are skilled in five (5) 
respective fields of specialization, including; operations and intelligence, demolition and 
sabotage, communication, weapons, and medical.  Furthermore, every member is cross-
trained with other specializations, so as to enhance his skills.  Each SF trooper has the 
ability to use Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) to influence a target community or 
individual.  The SF Team is a unique, unconventional combat organization that can plan 
and conduct special operations across a wide range of military missions.  Its tactical 
actions often have effects upon operational or strategic objectives. 
On the other extreme, the Scout Ranger’s basic unit is the 7-man team that is 
highly proficient in small-unit infantry tactics with the capability to operate 
independently. The team specializes in conducting commando raids, snipings, 
demolitions, reconnaissance missions and other guerilla warfare tactics and techniques. 
The training of Scout Ranger is designed to develop a person’s skill, stamina, and spirit.  
The Light Reaction Battalion’s (LRB) task is to conduct counter-terrorist 
operations in support of the AFP’s missions. The LRB’s capabilities include the ability to 
perform reconnaissance of terrorist incidents and locations, to eliminate and/or capture 
terrorists (and other high value targets), and involvement in hostage rescue and personnel 
recovery operations.  The LRB is made up of individuals who are highly trained in 
engaging in close quarter combat and sniping operations.  Moreover, since it is the only 
AFP unit that is trained and equipped by the U.S. Army Special Forces, it is considered 
as the most capable force for military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT).   
The Civil Affairs Group (CAG) conducts civil affairs and psychological 
operations in support of Army units conducting ISO.  It engages in Civil-Military 
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Operations (CMO) in order to gain public support for the Army’s role in ISO, and 
engages in Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) to both weaken the insurgent’s will to 
fight and to strengthen the fighting spirit of the troops.  The unit develops, produces, and 
evaluates PSYOPS products, using all forms of media.  The CAG is also tasked with 
conducting the training of Army personnel on CMO, PSYOPS, TRI-Media (print, radio, 
and TV), and Public Affairs courses.  
The Naval Special Warfare Group specializes in sea, air and land (SEAL) 
operations. Its capabilities include the ability to perform: reconnaissance operations, close 
combat, demolition operations, under water operations, counter-guerilla operations, 
counter-insurgency and intelligence operations, and special operations in maritime area 
and riverine environments in support of overall naval operations.  All personnel are 
tactically trained to act as divers, parachutists, demolitionists, and in the execution of 
special warfare operation from the sea, air and land.  Personnel are evaluated based on 
these skills, and must pass a qualification exam in order to become members of the Naval 
Special Warfare Group. 
The Philippine Marine special operations missions are conducted as part of the 
Marine Amphibious Brigade.  Marine special operations include riverine operations, 
mountain operations, jungle operations, amphibious reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, 
and airborne operations.47  The Force Recon Battalion’s primary function is to conduct 
reconnaissance in support of Marine Brigade operations and amphibious landings of the 
Philippine Marine Corps.  Its capabilities include the ability to conduct operations in 
built-up and urbanized areas; and the abilities to perform demolitions; air, land, and water 
insertions; interdiction; and counter-guerilla operations.  This specialized unit relies 
heavily on speed and stealth to effectively carry out its reconnaissance missions.  They 
are also used as counter-terrorist units by the Marine Brigades in its operations in 
southern Philippines.  Its three Companies are regularly attached to the Marine Brigades, 
thus complementing them with units capable of conducting special operations.  Some 
personnel of the Force Recon have received formal training from the Philippine Army 
Special Forces, those who were members of its forerunner, the Scout Raider Platoon. 
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The Philippine Air Force 710th Special Operations Wing’s organizational mission 
is to conduct contingency operations against hostile elements and civilian mass actions.48 
Its capabilities include the ability to conduct combat operations against enemy forces, 
coordination of air strikes, explosive ordnance operations, K-9 and handler training on 
explosives and bomb detection, and civil disturbance control.  One squadron of the 
Special Operations Group is attached to the AFP JSOG, doing counter-terrorist 
operations.  The Combat Group is tasked with conducting ISOs, with a specific area of 
operations under the Southern Luzon Command.  Other units of the SPOW perform ISO 
and Air Force base security operations in other parts of the country. 
The AFP Joint Special Operations Group conducts special military operations to 
counter terrorist activity throughout the country in order to protect its interests, citizens 
and properties.49  Its capabilities include the ability to engage in direct action operations 
against terrorists, special reconnaissance of terrorist targets, and military operations in 
urbanized terrain (MOUT).  Aside from its mandate to oppose terrorism, it is also tasked 
with supporting the anti-organized crime campaign efforts of the Philippine National 
Police.  The Army and Navy components of the AFPSOG are well trained and equipped 
but have limited air component capability.   
C. ASSESSMENT  
AFPSOF are sometimes used incorrectly, or underutilized, in the overall 
campaign against the threats to the Philippine government.  This is reflected in the 
different missions and functions given to the major service SOF and their actual 
utilization in the field.  There is neither a common understanding of what constitutes a 
special operations force among AFPSOF, nor of its capabilities.  Also, there is no 
common guideline that will guide them in the conduct of their operations.  The absence 
of a command and control structure at the joint operations level that will plan and 
orchestrate special operations hinders the effective utilization of SOF. 
The vast majority of the current utilization of AFPSOFs lacks strategic 
significance in the overall national military strategy.  SOFs of the three major services are 
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utilized in support of their own service operations.  The ARSOF, particularly the SF, for a 
long time was being utilized just like any other infantry battalion in the ISO campaign.  
SF battalions were given specific area of operations, along with other infantry battalions 
assigned to a controlling infantry brigade.  In this scenario, Naval Special Warfare units 
operate in support of the fleet operations, while the Marine Force Reconnaissance units 
operate in support of the Marine brigades.  Other subordinate units of the Special 
Operations Wing of the Air Force, on the other hand, are given specific area of operations 
along with infantry battalions for ISO mission.  
The inappropriate utilization of the AFPSOF is further aggravated by the absence 
of a joint SOF command and control structure at a geographically Unified Command 
level.  A geographically Unified Command is responsible for the overall conduct of AFP 
ISOs in its given areas of operations.  The absence of SOF C2 at a Unified Command 
level leaves the planning of SO to subordinate units of the commands.  Thus, at the 
highest level, in the Navy and Air Force SO is planned at the infantry division level, or its 
equivalent.  In reality, then, most of the SOF operations in the Philippines are conducted 
at tactical levels without strategic significance.  
The creation of AFPJSOG does not solve the problem faced by the SOF C2 
system.  AFPSOG has a specific function, which is to counter terrorism, and does not 
cover other SOF missions.  It is a separate unit from the major services SOF, and there is 
no command relationship link among these units.  Though the major services SOF 
components provided the troops that initially composed AFPJSOG, the unit is now under 
the administrative and operational control of the General Headquarters AFP (GHQAFP). 
Thus, the often topsy-turvy functionality and under-utilization of the AFPSOFs, 
boil down to the absence of a joint doctrine for SOF and a command and control structure 
that will oversee the operations of the entirety.  This inevitably leads to the formulation of 
missions, and assigning of functions to the SOF, to the major services based on the needs 
of their operating subordinate commands.  The strategic utilization of AFPSOF is thereby 
undermined due to lack of collaboration and coordination, brought about by the absence 
of a common guiding principle.  AFPSOF would be much more useful to the Philippines 
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if it worked to synchronize its missions, functions, and capabilities in order to optimize 







































IV. U. S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
The U.S. Special Operations Forces is made up of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
special operations forces (SOFs).  It is a small, but critical, portion of the U.S. Armed 
Forces, being comprised of special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs 
organizations that are task-organized to conduct contingency operations.  According to 
General Wayne Downing, USA, former Commander in Chief of U.S. Special Operations 
Command, 
SOFs provide an unprecedented range of capabilities, including regionally 
oriented assets for operations other than war (OOTW), specially tailored 
Joint Task Forces (JTFs) for unique missions in war, short-notice strategic 
strike forces for global deployment, and psychological operations 
(PSYOPS) and civil affairs (CA) capabilities for the entire range of 
military operations.50 
Special Operations Forces are designed to augment theater-based forces and, in 
response to crisis situation, normally operate with an appropriate mix of conventional 
forces under theater control.  Almost all SOF missions require joint planning and, 
oftentimes, also require working with allied or coalition forces.  The joint nature of SOF 
operations has been recognized as witnessed in the establishment of a permanent, unified 
command, namely the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM 
provides the national command authority with “SOFs that are, arguably, the most capable 
in the world.”51  USSOCOM is composed of four subordinate commands: U.S. Army 
Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Air Force Special 
Operations Command, and Joint Special Operations Command. 
A. THE FORCES 
1. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 
The Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) consist of Special Forces (SF), 
Ranger, special operations aviation (SOA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil 
affairs (CA) units both in the reserve and active components.  The U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC), which has approximately 30,000 active and reserve 
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personnel, serves as both the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Army 
component headquarters, and as a major Army command post.52  It provides trained and 
ready SF, Ranger, SOA, PSYOPS, and CA personnel to geographic Commander-in-
Chiefs (CINCs) and U.S. ambassadors.53  Operationally subordinate organizations of 
USASOC include the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC); the 75th Ranger 
Regiment; 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs 
and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC).54  
The SF make up a unique, unconventional combat arms organization.  The SF has 
five active component groups and two National Guard groups.  Approximately 1,400 
soldiers are assigned to a typical Special Forces Group (Airborne) [SFG(A)]; the 
operating level is the 12-man “A-team” (all expert or cross-trained in weapons, 
engineering, communications, medical aid, and operations and intelligence).55  The 
SFG(A) consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, a support company, and 
three battalions.  The SF battalions consist of a headquarters detachment, a support 
company (with similar structure, functioning as a group support company), and two or 
more SF companies.  SF companies consist of a company headquarters and six Special 
Forces operational detachments A (SFODAs) or the “A-teams”.56  
The Ranger is ARSOF’s light infantry force.  A Ranger regiment is composed of 
the headquarters and three battalions of approximately 600 assigned personnel, the 
primary combat element within the regiment.  It is similar to an airborne light infantry 
battalion, with the exception that it does not have anti-tank company or battalion mortars.  
The Ranger battalion consists of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and 
three Ranger companies.  Each company has three rifle platoons and a weapons 
platoon.57 
                                                 
52 Collins, J. (1993). Where Are Special Operations Forces? JFQ, Autumn 1993. (p. 8). 
53 US Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, August 1999, (p. 4-4). 
54 C4I Handbook for Integrated Planning. Appendix K: U.S. Special Operations Command C4I 
Systems and Networks, December 1997, (pp. 1-14). 
55 Association of the US Army (AUSA) Background Brief. Special Operations Forces: A Primer. 
Retrieved on August 11, 2004 from  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA277957 . 
56 US Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, August 1999, (p. 3-3). 
57 Ibid., (p. 3-7). 
35 
The Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) [SOAR(A)] is the U.S. 
Army’s special operations aviation unit.  It consists of a regimental HHC, three special 
operations aviation (SOA) battalions, and a special operations aviation support battalion.  
The regiment also has two table of distribution and allowance (TDA) units assigned to 
the HHC: the special operations aviation training company and a systems integration and 
maintenance office.  SOA units can be task-organized based on the mission expected, the 
theater of operations, and sustenance requirements.58 
The U.S. Army PSYOPS force provides strategic, operational, and tactical 
support to the geographic CINCs.  The U.S. Army PSYOPS force consists of one active 
component PSYOPS group and two tactical U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) groups.  These 
forces comprise regional, tactical, enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee (EPW/CI), and 
dissemination PSYOPS battalions.  The active component PSYOPS group comprises 
one-third of the U.S. Army PSYOPS force, consisting of regional, tactical, and 
dissemination battalions, and a strategic studies detachment (SSD).59 
Civil Affairs units support both conventional forces and SOF at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. The vast majority of the U.S. Army CA force consists of 
the reserve component.  The reserve component of CA taps into a pool of skilled 
specialists who are experienced in government, economic, and other public 
administrative functions, such as transportation, communications, education, and public 
works and utilities.  CA commands, brigades, and battalions support the five geographic 
CINCs and their supportive forces.  There is also one active component CA battalion 
with a worldwide mission to serve as CA generalists.60 
2. Naval Special Operations Component (NAVSOC) 
Naval special warfare (NSW) units include sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, SEAL 
delivery vehicle teams, and special boat teams, both in active and reserve components.  
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) is the Naval component 
of USSOCOM. The NAVSPECWARCOM consists of four Naval Special Warfare 
groups (NSWGs), each composed of SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) teams, SEAL delivery 
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vehicle teams and special boat team units.  The command has approximately 5,400 total 
active-duty personnel, including 2,450 SEALs and 600 Special Warfare Combatant-craft 
Crewmen (SWCC) and approximately 1,200 reserve personnel.61  The primary purpose 
of the Naval Reserve SEAL teams when they are called up is to augment active SEAL 
teams with individuals ready for duty.  Other organizations include the Naval Special 
Warfare Center, each having six functional detachments, and the Naval Special Warfare 
Development Group that does research, development, testing, and evaluative functions.  
The Naval Special Warfare Units (NSWUs), a subordinate unit of NSWG, is 
composed of three SEAL teams, a SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) team, and a special boat 
team.  The term “SEAL team” has two meanings: 1) a company-sized unit headquarters, 
or 2) a four-person team of combat swimmers.  The larger organization has eight platoons 
that are subdivided into squads, and then elements.  Forty-eight platoons of 16 men 
exist.62 
3. Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) 
AFSOF consists of units from special operations aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing 
aircrafts; does not include aircrafts from the USAF rescue/combat search and rescue 
units), special tactics, combat weather, and foreign internal defense units, both of the 
reserve and active components.63  The Air Force Special Operations Command 
represents the Air Force component of USSOCOM.  The command is comprised of 
approximately 19,000 active-duty troops, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard and 
civilian personnel.64  It is organized into one active-duty Special Operations wing, one 
Reserve Special Operations wing, one National Guard Special Operations wing, and two 
active-duty Special Operations groups.  Special operations aircraft are comprised of more 
than 200 highly specialized, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, including the AC-130H/U 
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(Specter Gunships), EC-130 (Commando Solo), MC-130E/H (Combat Talon), MC-130P 
(Combat Shadow), MH-60G (Pave Hawk), and MH-53J (Pave Low III).65 
B. MISSIONS, FUNCTIONS, AND CAPABILITIES 
The U.S. Armed Forces SOF missions fall into three broad areas: special 
operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs.  The area of special operations 
further subdivides into principal missions and collateral activities.  Special operations 
principal missions include direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, 
foreign internal defense, combating terrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and information operations.  
Collateral activities include coalition support, engaging in combat search and 
rescue, counterdrug activities, countermine activities, foreign humanitarian assistance, 
security assistance, and special activities.  SOF’s principal missions are enduring, and 
infrequently, change while collateral activities might shift with the changing international 
environment.  SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish 
principal missions, rather than for their collateral activities.  SOFs conduct collateral 
activities using the inherent capabilities resident in their primary missions. 66 
1. Principal Missions 
a. Direct Action (DA) 
These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions, 
conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments 
and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, 
recover, or damage designated targets.  DA differs from conventional offensive actions in 
the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of 
discriminate and  precise  use  of  force  to  achieve  specific  objective.67  DA   activities  
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include raids, ambushes, and direct assaults; stand-off attacks; terminal attack control and 
terminal guidance operations; recovery operations; precision destruction operations; and 
anti-surface operations.68  
b. Special Reconnaissance (SR) 
These are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special 
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify 
information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not 
normally found in conventional forces.  These actions provide an additive capability for 
commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance 
actions.69  SR activities include environmental reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance, 
target and threat assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.70 
c. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
These are operations that involve the participation of civilian and military 
agencies of governments in any of the action programs taken by another government (or 
other designated organization) to free and protect its society from subversion, 
lawlessness, and insurgency.71  SOF’s primary role in this inter-agency activity is to 
assess, train, advise, and assist host nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces with the 
tasks requiring their unique capabilities.  FID activities include HN military assistance 
and security of civilian populations.72 
d. Unconventional Warfare (UW)  
These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and 
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, 
with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, 
supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source.  It includes, but not 
limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and 
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unconventional assisted recovery (UAR).73  UW is unique in that it is a special operation 
that can either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander’s overall 
theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign.74 
e. Counterterrorism (CT) 
These are operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, 
deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.75  SOFs conduct CT missions as special 
operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means.  SOF’s activities within CT 
include, but are not limited to, intelligence operations, network and infrastructure attacks, 
hostage or sensitive material recovery, and non-kinetic activities.76 
f. Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD)  
CP refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture or 
recover WMD.  Major objectives of CP are: to prevent the acquisition of WMD (and their 
delivery systems); roll back proliferation of WMD, where it has already occurred; deter 
the use of WMD (and their delivery systems); and adapt U.S. military forces and 
planning to operate against the threats posed by WMD (and their delivery systems).  The 
core capabilities of CP include skills in the following activities: counter-force, active 
defense, passive defense, and consequence management.  SOF focuses on counter-force 
tasks, conducting CP missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low 
visibility means.77  
g. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) 
These consist of CA and other tasks conducted by CA, to support 
commanders in conducting civil-military operations (CMO).  CA activities are either 
directed by higher authorities or enacted by sheer operational necessity.  These activities 
include establishing and conducting a military government or civil administration within 
operational areas to maintain civil order until the government can be restored or transition 
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can peacefully be made to other appropriate authorities.  Such activities are planned and 
conducted by the CA, involving application of functional specialty expertise in civil 
sector disciplines that are normally the responsibility of the civil government.  CA 
operations are predominantly joint, inter-agency, and multinational in nature, and are 
conducted through or with indigenous populations, authorities and institutions, 
international organizations, and non-government organizations (NGOs).78 
h. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
These are planned operations that convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 
and individuals.  The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 
behaviors favorable to the originator’s objectives.79  PSYOP planning and employment 
considerations include, force multiplier, combatant commander responsibilities, PSYOP 
applications, and PSYOP support to information operations.  The capabilities of PSYOP 
include, developing, producing, distributing, and disseminating PSYOP programs and 
products; coordinating and directing PSYOP programs; producing PSYOP studies and 
estimates; supporting enemy prisoner of war (EPW), civilian internee (CI), and dislocated 
civilian (DC) operations; providing support to host-nation assistance operation; and 
employing tactical PSYOP.80    
i. Information Operations (IO) 
IOs involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems while, simultaneously, defending one’s own information and information 
systems.81  IOs can be conducted in all phases of an operation, across the range of 
military operations, and at every level of war.  IOs involve many different capabilities 
that are applied either individually or through integration.  Major capabilities include 
computer network operations, electronic warfare, operational security, PSYOP, and 
military deception.  Beyond intelligence support, other capabilities include counter-
                                                 
78 Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. December 17, 2003. (p. II-10). 
79 Joint Pub 1-02. US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. April 12, 
2001 (As amended through October 7, 2004). 
80 Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. December 17, 2003. (p. II-11). 
81 Joint Pub 1-02. US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. April 12, 
2001 (As amended through October 7, 2004). 
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intelligence, physical security, information assurance, public affairs, and CMO.  IOs may 
involve complex legal and policy issues, requiring careful review and national-level 
coordination and approval.82  
2. Collateral Activities 
a. Coalition Support (CS) 
CS improves the interaction of coalition partners and U.S. military forces.  
This might include training coalition partners on tactics and techniques, assisting with 
communications equipment in order to integrate them into the coalition command and 
intelligence structure, and establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and 
combat service support.  SOF teams assigned to coalition units often provide the joint 
force commander (JFC) with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and 
activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JFC command and control.83 
b. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 
CSAR involves specific tasks performed by rescue forces to effect the 
recovery of distressed personnel during war, or military operations other than war 
(MOOTW).84  SOF maintains an inherent and/or organic capability to conduct self-
personnel recovery and/or CSAR within its core mission force structure.  Several abilities 
unique to the SOF make these forces highly suited for this mission.  For example, they 
possess the ability to operate in hostile defense systems and conduct joint air, ground, or 
sea operations deep within hostile or denied territory at night, or in adverse weather 
conditions.85 
c. Counterdrug (CD) Activities 
CD activities are active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the 
production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.86  The CD mission is very similar to FID 
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84 Joint Pub 1-02. US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. April 12, 
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85 Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. April 17, 1998. (p. II-12). 
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and UW missions.  Using their skill in cross-cultural communication, SOF train HN CD 
forces on critical skills required to conduct small-unit CD operations.87 
d. Countermine (CM) Activities   
CM activities attempt to reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants 
and friendly military forces posed by mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices.  
Using their organic engineering and demolition capability, SOF teams train HN forces in 
techniques to locate, recognize, and safely dispose of mines and other explosive 
devices.88 
e. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) 
 FHA involves programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of 
disasters (natural or manmade), or other endemic conditions--such as human pain, 
disease, hunger, or privation--that might present a serious threat to life or result in great 
damage or loss of property.  FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and 
duration; the assistance provided being designed to complement the efforts of the HN 
civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.  
SOF units are well-suited to perform FHA activities in remote areas because of their 
ability to deploy rapidly, regional orientation, organic communications ability, and ability 
to sustain operations under adverse environmental conditions.89 
f. Security Assistance (SA)   
SA consists of groups of programs authorized by the U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, both as amended, or 
other related statutes by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and 
other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in the furtherance of 
national policies and objectives.90  The primary SOF role in SA is to provide mobile 
training teams (MTTs) and other forms of training assistance.  SOFs are particularly 
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effective in SA because they use the same regional orientation, communications, 
mobility, and expertise developed for FID and UW missions.91 
g. Special Activities 
These are activities conducted in support of national foreign policy 
objectives that are planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. government is not 
apparent or publicly acknowledged.  They also function in support of such activities, but 
are not intended to influence U.S. political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.  
They also do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of 
intelligence, or related support functions.92  SOF may perform any of their primary 
missions during special activities, subject to limitations imposed by laws.  Special 
activities require authorization by the President and Congressional approval and 
oversight.93 
3. Functions and Capabilities 
a.  Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 
Special Forces units perform seven primary missions: Unconventional 
Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action and 
Counterterrorism, Information Operations, and Counterproliferation of WMD.  Special 
Forces can plan and conduct special operations across the entire range of military 
operations.  Often Special Forces units are required to perform collateral activities in 
addition to their primary missions.  The unique SF skills that are keys to the successes 
experienced by the SF units in the field include their: language/linguistic qualifications, 
regional orientation, area studies, and interpersonal relations.  
The Special Forces Group (Airborne) [SFG(A)] constitutes the largest 
combat element of Army SOF.  SFG(A) is regionally oriented, supporting a regional 
CINC,  and  is  a  flexible  organization  designed  to  have  self-contained  command and  
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control and support elements for missions of long duration.  Because of this, the SFG(A) 
has the capability to form the nucleus of the Army special operations task force 
(ARSOTF).94 
Rangers are often referred to as the “masters” of special light infantry 
operations.  Rangers emphasize DA operations that include attacks to temporarily seize 
and secure key objectives and other light infantry operations requiring unique abilities.  
Ranger DA operations are normally deep penetration raids or interdiction operations 
against targets of strategic or operational significance.  Typical DA missions for Rangers 
include forced-entry operations, airfield seizures, and the capture or destruction of enemy 
targets.  The Rangers, unlike other ARSOF, have a global orientation, as opposed to 
being regionally oriented.  They can deploy worldwide when it is felt that a U.S. military 
presence would serve U.S. interests.  Ranger units do not have the capability or mission 
to provide mobile training team (MTT) assistance to indigenous military or paramilitary 
forces.  They may, however, participate in joint or multinational training exercises with 
allied or friendly military forces.95 
Special operations aviation provides the special operations component 
commander with the capability to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate SOF elements 
engaged in all core and collateral missions.  The mission of Army Special Operations 
Aviation (ARSOA) is to plan, conduct, and support special air operations by 
clandestinely penetrating hostile and denied airspace.  ARSOA aircraft operate in all 
environments and terrain: deserts, mountains, jungles, arctic areas, urban areas, and over 
water.  They can operate from maritime platforms, conduct long-range precision 
navigation to point targets, and operate in high-risk environments.  ARSOA medium-
assault and heavy-assault aircraft have the capability to refuel in mid-flight, thereby 
increasing their range.  Its aircraft can be employed in flying at night (using night vision 
goggles  or  other  night  vision  systems),  and  is  able  to  keep  a  low-level  profile  for  
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clandestine infiltration or exfiltration operations.  In addition to providing worldwide 
aviation support to the SOF community, these units can also provide forward air control 
and close air support.96 
Psychological operations are aimed at demoralizing the enemy by causing 
dissension and unrest among military units, while, simultaneously, convincing local 
populations to support U.S. objectives and troops.  Commanders plan PSYOP activities 
to convey selected information aimed at influencing the emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 
and individuals. PSYOP activities are planned, coordinated, and executed before, during, 
and after conflicts.  For example, units might disseminate propaganda messages in the 
form of leaflets, posters, broadcasts and audiovisual tapes.  Because of the unique nature 
of PSYOP activity, each unit has its own intelligence and audiovisual specialists.97 
Civil affairs units are designed to assist commanders in discharging their 
responsibilities toward the civilian population.  They accomplish this by providing 
civilian government agencies with a liaison to prevent civilian interference with tactical 
operations.  CA elements are force multipliers that perform the non-military aspects and 
phases of an operation to enhance military efforts and promote the legitimacy of military 
operations.  CA taps into a pool of skilled specialists experienced in government, 
economic, and other public administrative functions, such as public transportation, 
communications, education, and public works and utilities.98 
b. Naval Special Operations Component (NAVSOC) 
NAVSPECWARCOM is a Navy Echelon II unit, i.e., it responds to 
USSOCOM (and the theater CINCs) for its joint role, and responds to the Department of 
the Navy for its service responsibilities.  Active and reserve component SEAL teams, 
SDV teams, and special boat teams are task-organized and designated by the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense to conduct special operations.99 
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SEAL teams are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct DA, UW, 
FID, SR, and CT operations, primarily in maritime and riverine environments.  These 
operations include sabotage, demolition, intelligence collection, hydrographic 
reconnaissance, and training, as well as advising friendly military and paramilitary forces 
in the conduct of naval and joint special operations.  SEAL teams may also be employed 
in direct support of conventional naval and maritime operations.  Infiltration and 
exfiltration of SEAL teams from the target areas can be carried out via submarine, 
surface vessel, aircraft, or land vehicle. SEAL teams can also perform limited civic action 
tasks that are incidental to FID, as well as other collateral activities.100 
SEAL Delivery Vehicle teams are maritime combat forces organized, 
trained, and equipped to operate and maintain combat submersible systems in maritime or 
riverine environments.  SDV teams are tasked with employing, operating, and 
maintaining combat submersible systems in the conduct of naval and joint special 
operations.  Typical mission include launch and recovery via submarine, surface 
combatant, or noncombatant craft.  SDV teams also conduct limited DA missions, such 
as port and harbor anti-shipping attacks and raids.  They can also conduct hydrographic 
reconnaissance and other intelligence-gathering missions.101 
Special Boat teams are organized, trained, and equipped to operate a 
variety of surface combatant craft in both maritime and riverine environments.  SBTs are 
tasked with employing, operating, and maintaining a variety of surface combatant craft 
used to conduct and support naval and joint special operations, riverine warfare, and 
coastal patrol and interdiction.  SBTs employ offshore, open-water, fast patrol boats and 
shallow-draft riverine patrol craft.  They employ different types of water craft to meet 
different needs. These needs depend on such factors as the needs for endurance or the 
ability to draft, range, seaworthiness, and carrying capacity.  The SBT’s primary mission 
is coastal interdiction and SEAL insertion/extraction.  They can also provide small-
caliber gunfire support and limited shore bombardment.  Other tasks include riverine 
support, intelligence collection, and operational deception.102 
                                                 




c. Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) 
Special operations aircraft are highly specialized, fixed- and rotary-wing 
aircraft equipped for deep penetration of hostile areas under all weather conditions.  
These aircraft are capable of operating in hostile airspace, at low altitudes, under 
conditions of minimum visibility, all with precision navigation.  They are specially 
configured with electronic defense systems and navigational aids.  The crews can operate 
from airfields, conduct classified missions, and fly combat SAR missions.  Some AFSOF 
aircraft are capable of performing autonomous DA and SR missions, as well as PSYOP 
support missions.103 
The AFSOC Special Tactics Squadron and Special Tactics Teams (STT) 
are designed to have a short reaction time, i.e. possessing the ability to rapidly deploy 
forces that are capable of providing positive control of the air/ground interface during 
joint or unilateral special operations missions.  Members of the STT include primarily 
combat controllers and para-rescue personnel.  An STT conducts reconnaissance, 
surveillance, assessment, and establishment of potential selected assault zone sites.  They 
position and monitor terminal and en route navigational aids and target designation 
equipment.  
The teams provide visual flight rules, with limited instrument flight rules, 
air traffic control, and long-range secure command and control communications in the 
objective area.  Para-rescue provides personnel recovery and casualty treatment and 
staging areas.  The teams can also provide limited ground direction for close air support 
within the objective area.  The STTs use several infiltration techniques; the teams can 
parachute in using high-altitude low-opening (HALO) or high-altitude high-opening 
(HAHO); swing in; or other methods.  STTs are trained to remove obstacles with 
demolitions, gather intelligence information, provide local weather observations, and 
train U.S. and allied personnel.  STTs can also be trained for special rescue operations.104 
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V. MAJOR AFP SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter three case studies of major AFP special operations will be 
examined.  All three were conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, 
utilizing special operations units against threat groups that have perennially threatened 
the country.  These operations were designed to obtain some strategic objectives for the 
Philippine government and, thus, involved the participation of high-ranking officials.  A 
case study in which the AFP engaged the Communist-inspired Hukbalahap, or Huk 
insurgents, in the 1940’s is included.  The other two cases both examine two different 
instances when the AFP’s forces engaged the radical Muslim Islamist terrorist group, 
Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG.  Allegedly, the ASG has links to al Qaeda, the world’s 
leading terrorist organization.  
Other special operations that have been conducted by the AFP and special 
operations units were considered for study, such as the Philippine Naval Special Warfare 
Group (NSWG), Army Special Forces and Scout Rangers from the late 1940’s to the 
present, including operations against the Local Communist Movement (LCM) and 
Southern Philippines Separatist Groups (SPSG).  However, the three episodes chosen 
were the most relevant to this study of strategic special operations conducted by the AFP 
and were carefully selected for their strategic nature.  Although the cases are not large in 
scale and definitive of the AFP in their style of execution, they are adequate for deriving 
plausible conclusions.  The three operations all sought to achieve major national policy 
aims, rather than just tactical objectives.  Given the importance of their objectives and 
their high-risk nature, they tend to demonstrate that the success or failure of special 
operations could have strategic implications for the Philippines.  Failure of these 
operations could result in damage to Philippine national prestige, as evidenced by the 
Lamitan incident, discussed below.  
The following case histories will help answer the questions that have been laid 
down in Chapter I of this thesis.  They may also help to determine some of the recurrent 
problems in the past that have marred the conduct of special operations in the Philippines.  
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Moreover, the cases demonstrate the strategic utility of special operations and the units 
that execute them.  Lastly, the case studies highlight the impact of special operations 
upon the threat groups that employ unconventional methods and its contribution to the 
course and outcome to the conflict. 
B. CASE STUDIES 
Right after World War II, many countries, especially those in Southeast Asia, 
became trouble spots due to the threat of Communism.  The Philippines was not spared 
the same problem that the Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese people had come to face.  
The Communist insurgency in the Philippines was (and is still) rooted in the nation's 
history of peasant rebellions.  Discontentment among peasants over land tenancy and 
pressures over land reforms inspired increasing violence during the post-war period, 
leading to the Communist-led Hukbalahap, or “Huk” rebellion.  The Huks fought 
unconventionally-- they were initially successful by using guerrilla warfare tactics.   The 
fighting from 1947-1949 seemed to favor the enemy of the government (i.e., the Huks).   
By 1954, with the government’s effective and successful strategy of counter-
insurgency, the insurgents’ influence over the populace died out.  However, a remnant of 
the Communist-led Huks and a handful of new young revolutionaries continued the fight 
in succeeding years.  In December 1968, this revolutionary coalition founded the CPP 
and the NPA, its armed component.  The CCP/NPA has now waged an insurgent war 
against the Philippine government for 35 –years.  
After World War II, the AFP was not prepared to fight an insurgency.105  The 
armed forces had been organized and trained for conventional wars by their American 
trainers.  The soldiers drilled in conventional tactics, techniques, and procedures by 
platoons, companies, and battalions.  History suggests that “conventional style” or 
“sweeping-type” military operations usually do not work in stopping a 
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counterinsurgency, often producing little more than abuse of civilians.106  A good 
example of such an operation was “Operations Supercharge.”  According to Kerkvliet, 
infantry units that were supported by tanks rumbled across the rice fields and charged 
through villages.  Air Force planes dropped bombs, including napalm, on suspected Huk 
hideouts and strongholds.107   
In order to minimize the collateral damage of big conventional forces, Secretary 
of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, set the stage for the creation of special units for 
conducting counter-insurgencies.  It was during his time in office that the Scout 
Rangers108 and the Philippine Marines were established.  Other formations that evolved 
during this period included the “Nenita”109 unit of the 7th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) 
and “Force X” of the 16th Philippine Constabulary (PC) Company.  These special units 
were very effective in counter-insurgency operations.  They were extremely useful in: 
small unit operations, gathering of intelligence, and tracking down and neutralizing Huk 
leaders.  Their effectiveness and usefulness has seldom been better exemplified than in 
the operations conducted by Force X of the 16th PC Company in 1948.   
1. The Undercover Patrol: Force X Raid in Central Luzon, April 1948 
The forces initially arrayed against the Huk were PC companies.  They were 
lightly armed and had a nominal strength of less than 100 officers and men.  The PC was 
not well organized, well trained, or well equipped to face the much more organized and 
armed guerrillas.  For political reasons, the PC units were garrisoned in a camp within the 
villages, where they were isolated from the local population.  Whenever the PC units 
were called into action, the guerrillas would attack before they could arrive at the 
objective.  Thus, the constraints this put on the PC units created problems which usually 
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107 Kerkvliet, B. (1977). The Huk Rebellion. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (p. 211)   
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109 The Nenita unit was organized as a small semi-independent hunter-killer detachment to seek out 
and destroy top Huk leaders. From 1946 to 1949, some of the most effective military operations against the 
Huks were conducted by this unit. The name “Nenita” was gotten from a girl’s name known to the first 
commander of 7th BCT. 
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would prevent a small detachment from staying for long periods of time.  Staying inside 
the garrison for most of their time also resulted in the PC’s being poor at intelligence 
collection, poor in civil-military relations, and having behavioral problems among its 
troops.  This kind of situation was no help in the counter-insurgency program of the 
government.  According to Valeriano and Bohannan, “The situation was discouraging. 
Patrols were seldom successful.  There seemed to be neither a reason nor capability for 
anti-guerrilla action.”110  
With the continued constraints put upon the PC by politicians, as well as by the 
Army in the operational areas, the peace and order situation steadily deteriorated.  It 
finally reached a point that the defense leadership embraced the strategy of targeting the 
top leadership of the Huk.  The government wanted Luis Taruc, the Huk “Supremo,” and 
other top guerrilla leaders to be neutralized in order to tip the balance of the fight in favor 
of the government.  Thus the PC formed Force X, tasked with locating, and then 
neutralizing, guerrilla leaders.     
However, in order to accomplish this highly sensitive and high-risk mission that 
had been assigned to them by higher, headquarters staff, Force X first had to contend 
with a challenge common to any counter-insurgency, i.e., obtaining adequate intelligence 
for the task.  The force needed to infiltrate the guerrillas in order to collect information 
about the organization.  At that time, little was known about the underground 
revolutionary movement by those above ground.  As a result, the enemy had strongholds 
with a robust “underground” infrastructure.  The Huks also enjoyed the strong support of 
many of the local people.  Force X, therefore, found the need to conduct special 
operations against the guerrillas.  
Force X was organized in 1948 when the Huk movement was at its peak and 
ready for expansion to other areas.  Despite this impressive development, however, the 
Huks lacked firearms and most importantly communications, which contributed to their 
inflexibility and unresponsiveness.111  This period provided the best opportunity for the 
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government to infiltrate and conduct deception operations against the Huks, reflected 
Colonel Valeriano, the Commander of 7th BCT, of which 16th PC Company was under.  
According to Valeriano and Bohannan,  
Their command structure was not well organized or well understood by the Huks 
themselves.  Just prior to this time, the Huk in Southern Luzon had thought themselves to be 
independent.  When their commander, a Colonel Villegas, died, some of their units tried to 
establish contact with the more highly developed and organized forces in Central Luzon under 
Taruc, who was also eager to contact them.112   
The 16th PC Company, under a certain Lieutenant Maraña, was tasked to form 
Force X. Maraña screened and selected forty-four enlisted personnel, and three officers of 
his men to undergo special training for the conduct of a highly sensitive, clandestine 
operation.113  This select group was trained at an undisclosed training base camp, deep in 
the rain forest, where they remained isolated for several months.  The mission of this unit 
was so secret that only selected officers were authorized to visit.   
The training, designed to enable the force to conduct “Large-Unit Infiltration,” 
included training in: the use of small-unit tactics, language (dialects), intelligence, 
communication, first aid, escape and evasion techniques, etc. According to Valeriano, 
“The basic idea was to turn this special unit into a realistic pseudo-Huk unit that could, in 
enemy disguise, infiltrate deep into enemy territory.”114  They were organized, equipped, 
and armed the same way as the Huks they were fighting.  At the very start of their 
training, the chosen men were dressed in civilian clothes and armed with guerrilla 
firearms (supplied by the unit’s intelligence officer).  An important phase of the training 
focused on indoctrination, where the troops were taught by converted, captured rebels, or 
rebels who had surrendered.  Troops were given instructions on matters only known 
within the guerrilla community, such as the manner of greeting, the manner of addressing 
senior guerrillas, certain ways of eating and dressing, and certain special operating 
procedures (SOPs) for their daily ablutions in the river. Valeriano adds: 
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They were dressed in civilian clothes and armed only with captured 
weapons that had been accumulated by my S2 (intelligence officer).  They 
were given indoctrination booklets, propaganda publications, and other 
reading material of sort carried by Huks.  They were given things 
generally found on Huk dead, such as soiled handkerchiefs and love 
mementos from girlfriends. During the four-week training period, all 
conversation was conducted in terms of the pre-assigned enemy 
identities—the enemy ranks, aliases, and pet names commonly used in 
guerrilla units in Southern Luzon. The men were addressed as comrades, 
brothers, members of the proletariat. They were taught to sing Huk songs. 
They learned to deliver speeches in Huk style.115  
Prior to the deployment of Force X to their area of operation (i.e., the Candaba 
Swamp), two things were done to reinforce the persuasiveness of their cover story: 1) a 
special reconnaissance was conducted around the infiltration route and the general area 
between central and southern Luzon, the proposed operational area, and 2) wounded 
soldiers from the Army hospital who could manage to walk were recruited and used as 
props during the operation.  Two of these soldiers volunteered later to join Force X.  The 
special patrol took notes about the trails, observed the attitude of the local populace, and 
identified some obstacles, all of which were disseminated to Force X.  All this was done 
to ensure that Force X would be able to blend in, without any suspicions, when it 
immersed itself into Huk territory-- the Candaba Swamp. 
On April 14, 1948, Force X was ready to march.  They crossed their designated 
line of departure that evening and, within a few minutes, a carefully staged encounter 
with another government unit ensued.  The members of Force X, carrying their 
“wounded” volunteers from the Army hospital, then withdrew towards deep, enemy 
territory.  By later in the evening of that same day, Force X had managed to link-up with 
real Huk units, Squadrons 5 and 17, after being intercepted by a Huk sentry deep inside 
enemy grounds.  They were interrogated as to their identities, unit, and intentions.  They 
were asked about their area of operations and the route they had taken from southern 
Luzon, which they described perfectly.  Because of their extensive preparations, their 
cover stories stood up well to the numerous interrogations that followed, to the point that 
they were promised to be introduced to Luis Taruc, himself.     
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The combined force of Force X and two Huk squadrons stayed together for 
almost two days, exchanging stories about guerrilla life and their experiences in 
operations.  Force X delivered their rehearsed stories about southern Luzon guerrilla 
units, while Squadrons 2 and 17 talked about the prowess of the central Luzon Huks, 
particularly their Supremo.  From their conversations with the Huk squadrons, Force X 
collected vital information about the guerrilla movement, including the local conditions, 
propaganda activities, supply systems, etc.  They also learned the names of those local 
officials who were in collusion with the guerrillas, including the names of Mayors and 
Chiefs of Police.  Moreover, Force X found out that some PC soldiers were giving 
information to the guerrillas.   
On April 18, four days into the operation, two more Huk squadrons, including the 
“enforcing squadron” under a certain commander, Bundalian, who was charged by Luis 
Taruc to enforce Huk justice, linked up with the combined Huk force.  With the arrival of 
Squadrons 4 and 21, the ratio between the real Huks and Force X was 1:3.  Still, by the 
end of fifth day, the real Huks had no idea of Force X’s actual identity.  According to 
Valeriano, “During those five days, the Huk squadrons showed no indication of 
suspecting that Force X was other than what it seemed to be.”116  Finally, on the sixth 
day, Lieutenant Maraña gave the order to attack.  According to Valeriano, “There was 
actually a slaughter in the area. Two Huk squadrons were practically deactivated as of 
that moment.”117   
The bold and daring operation had been a success. Valeriano recounts: 
At the end of the battle, when the Huk withdrew, we counted 82 killed in 
the action that did not last more than 30 minutes. Among those identified 
by the town mayor of that region were three commanders including 
Commander Bundalian, the commander of the assassin group. Two others 
were commanders sent by the Huk Supremo to make a personal screening 
of Force X. 118 
                                                 
116 Valeriano, N & Bohannan, C. (1962). Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. 
New York: Praeger. (p. 146). 
117 Valeriano, N. (1961).Military Operations. Retrieved on 02 November 2004 from 
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/hukcampaign15june1961III.htm. 
118 Bohannan, C. (1961). Unconventional Operations. Counter-Guerrilla Seminar Fort Bragg, 15 June 
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Lieutenant Maraña immediately contacted his higher headquarters to update them 
of the progress of the operation, and advised them to intercept the withdrawing Huks.  
The follow-on operations in the area by conventional forces resulted to the killing of 21 
Huks and the capture of nine more.  Out of more than 100 local inhabitants detained for 
interrogation, 17 turned out to be members of the squadrons that Force X had decimated. 
119  Additionally, about three weeks later, after the operation, a firefight between two 
groups of Huks was monitored by intelligence operatives.  Investigation disclosed that a 
Huk squadron from the adjoining province, on a foraging mission, had met another 
squadron from central Luzon.  Each thought they had stumbled on another "Force X" 
unit, with a resulting casualty list of 11 dead and three seriously wounded.  
2. Father Blanco Rescue Operation: Basilan Province,  May 7-15, 1993. 
The threat posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG, has increased the demand for 
AFP special operations units in recent years, such as the Army’s Scout Rangers and 
Special Forces, the Navy’s Special Warfare Group and the Marine’s Force 
Reconnaissance Battalion.120  Up until this time, it had been a practice in the Philippines 
to rely upon ad hoc organizations and collection of disparate units to plan and execute 
special operations mission, as evidenced by the Lamitan incident which will be discussed 
below. 
The 1990’s witnessed the emergence of a new terrorist group, the Abu Sayyaf 
Group, in the Philippines.  In the early part of 1990, the ASG was all over the front page 
of major national and international daily newspapers when they launched a series of 
kidnappings in the island province of Basilan in southern Philippines, targeting foreign 
nationals, wealthy local businessmen, and religious leaders.121  Although a relatively 
small group, the ASG has wrought immense damage to the country’s image as of late.  
For example, kidnapping incidents in the Philippines have tremendously affected its 
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120 The Marine Force Recon Battalion was tasked by higher command to conduct rescue operations in 
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121 AFP Field Circular 3-7-1. (2001). Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study. Manila: AFP J3/ 
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economy; many foreign investors have backed out or frozen their expansion plans in the 
country; and tourism was at its lowest after the ASG started targeting internationals.  
The emergence of this new threat to national security has contributed to the rise in 
instability in the southern Philippines.  Consequently, this signaled to military and 
political leaders the need for developing and improving the armed forces’ capability in 
special operations to meet the security challenges posed by terrorist groups, such as the 
Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiya (JI), and al Qaeda.  
The southern Philippines, particularly the province of Basilan, has been in turmoil 
since the Mindanao crisis in the mid-1970’s.  It was at that time that the Muslim, 
secessionist movement, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), started their 
offensive against the government, during the administration of President Ferdinand 
Marcos.  Hostilities against the government and the crime rate of had been building up in 
the province for years.  As security and economic problems started to trigger unrest 
among the populations in the area, it became the breeding ground of the Abu Sayyaf 
Group.  
The first recorded atrocities committed by the ASG were the 1991 attack on a 
military checkpoint in Sumagdang, on the outskirts of Isabela, and the bombing of the 
missionary ship, M/V Doulous, in Zamboanga City, killing two foreign Christian 
missionaries and wounding forty others.122  In 1992, the group claimed responsibility for 
bomb attacks in Zamboanga City and Davao City.  According to Zamora, 
In the same year, Edwin Angeles, the operations officer of the group, 
offered the public a view of the Abu Sayyaf's criminal bent. Disguised as a 
policeman, Angeles abducted a businesswoman in Davao and hid her in 
the house of Abdurajack Janjalani, the founder of the ASG, in Basilan, 
where she was later released after paying a one million peso ransom 
($18,000 in U.S. dollars).123  
In March of 1993, Abdurajack Janjalani, the founding leader of the ASG, took 
custody of Spanish Claretian priest, Bernardo Blanco, the parish priest of Lantawan 
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Municipality, Basilan.  Reverend Bernardo Blanco was abducted at gunpoint in a remote 
barangay, village on the island in March 18, 1993 by a, so-called, MNLF “Lost 
Command,”124 led by Jul Jilang.125  In April, the Abu Sayyaf Group hit the front pages of 
major national newspapers when it master-minded the kidnapping of Luis Anthony "Ton-
Ton" Biel III, a five-year old boy, and his grandfather, Luis Biel Sr., owner of a bus 
company in Basilan.126  The ASG released Luis Biel Sr., after receiving ransom money, 
but held the boy.  Abdul Ashmad, the intelligence officer of the Abu Sayyaf, later 
announced, in a press conference, that the ASG would hold the little boy until their other 
demands were met.  Among the demands were: 1) the removal of all Catholic symbols in 
Muslim communities; 2) the banning of all foreign fishing vessels in the Sulu and Basilan 
seas; and, 3) that an Ulama be brought into the negotiations. 
Thus began the first hostage crisis involving the Abu Sayyaf Group--the 3-month 
ordeal that was to become the new, Ramos administration’s most serious crisis.  The 
incident was, at that time, the fourth abduction of a Roman Catholic cleric in the 
Philippines in five months.  In the hours following the abduction, the ASG demanded that 
ransom shall be paid for the release of the hostages, and that the three other demands 
must be met in order to put an end to the crisis.  In response, the administration set up a 
group of negotiators, composed of local government officials and prominent Muslim 
religious leaders, to work for the peaceful resolution of the crisis.  Days, then weeks, and 
then months passed, as the progress of the negotiation slowed down, with no end at sight.  
The Ramos administration geared up for the worst in the event that negotiation 
failed.  General Lisandro Abadia, the AFP’s Chief-of-Staff at that time, in preparation for 
a hostage rescue scenario should the negotiation fail, directed the Southern Mindanao 
Command, or SOUTHCOM, to step up its intelligence gathering about the ASG.  
SOUTHCOM, upon receiving the instructions, immediately tasked Marine Brigadier 
General, Guillermo Ruiz, the Commander of the 2nd Marine Brigade, and, 
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simultaneously, the Commander of the Basilan Internal Command, to organize, plan and 
be ready to execute a special operations to rescue the hostages, neutralize the Muslim 
terrorists, and seize their stronghold, Camp Al-Madinah, the most likely place where the 
ASG was holding out.  
In light of the very sensitive nature of the highly publicized crisis, which had now 
lasted three months, Marine Brigadier General Ruiz asked the Commandant of the 
Philippine Marine Corps, Major General Eduardo Cabanlig, for the services of the Corps’ 
special operations unit, the 61st Marine Reconnaissance Company (61st MC)127.  At that 
time, the 61st MC was under the command of Marine Captain Custodio Parcon Jr., an 
Army Special Forces qualified officer.  Brigadier General Ruiz felt that the negotiations 
would soon fail because he understood the nature of the ASG.  He knew that the ASG 
was a newly organized Islamic fundamentalist group; that its leaders had just arrived 
from Afghanistan from fighting with the Mujahideens; and that it was trying to prove 
itself to both the locals, their “would be” supporters, and also to their own members.  The 
group, as Ruiz understood it, was in its initial stages of establishing its credibility and 
reputation as a terrorist organization and, thus, that negotiations might be difficult.  
As soon as the 61st MC received the warning order from a higher command, 
Marine Captain Parcon, himself, was faced with several problems.  Among other things, 
the company did not have enough special equipment in its inventory.  Thus, Parcon had 
to request night vision goggles (NVG), global positioning systems (GPS), night scopes 
for their weapons, extra radios, sniper rifles, and several silenced weapons.  Fortunately, 
the Marine Corps had just received some NVGs, GPS, and night scopes.  The 61st MC 
was also fortunate in that the Signal Company was able to loan extra radios for this 
mission.  The problem of producing the sniper rifles and silenced weapons was answered 
by Marine Captain Juancho Sabban, the intelligence chief of Brigadier General Ruiz.  
Captain Sabban voluntarily offered some of his personally owned prize collections for the 
rescuer’s use.  All the testing and retesting of the newly acquired and loaned special 
equipment were done in a week’s time upon the unit’s arrival in Zamboanga City.   
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which was formed in 1995.   
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The 61st MC was flown by C-130 transport aircraft to Zamboanga City from their 
headquarters at Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila.  Upon arrival, Captain Parcon immediately 
coordinated for a secure place where the Recon Marines could test their weapons with the 
new equipment.  This process of working on new equipment prior to a mission has its 
own problems.  Some suggested that they still did not have the confidence necessary to 
operate with their new weapons.  Some complained that the equipment was unfit.  For 
instance, complaint arose that the night scopes did not fit their firearms.  The weapons 
specialist for the company later found out that the scopes had missing parts and, thus, 
could not be properly attached to the M-16s.  The following day, the weapons specialist 
attempted to find a gunsmith who could design some sort of a bracket to hold the scope in 
place.  The effort turned out to be a failure because the prototype bracket the gunsmith 
designed could not stand the recoil of the M-14 and M-16.  Thus, the night scope that was 
intended to be attached to the M-16, instead became a hand held night scope.  The loaned 
sniper rifle was given to one of the snipers of the company who had no problem with it.  
After a few days of preparations, the 61st MC was ready to board two Navy patrol crafts, 
and proceeded to Basilan Province.   
Upon arrival, Captain Parcon carried out special reconnaissance of the area.  
Furthermore, he requested regular intelligence updates from the Brigade intelligence staff 
officer.  Captain Parcon faced two initial problems.  First, the intelligence on hand was 
inadequate.  Not only did reports coming from different intelligence units conflict with 
each other, they also suggested that there were numerous targets and that the specific area 
where the hostages were kept could not be determined.  A big break, however, came 
when a seemingly credible source, a lady reporter who earlier interviewed the ASG and 
the hostages, volunteered to share some information.128  The reporter described the 
general characteristics and features of the area of the enemy’s main camp.  During her 
last interview, she had also been able to estimate the distances of the routes the ASG 
took.  Despite the new development, the final plan of the task force incorporated a few of 
the reporter’s information.  Captain Parcon, however, considered the new information in 
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his final plan.  The information provided by the recent visitors proved to be true and 
precise.         
The second problem was the location of the ASG camp.  The enemy camp was 
strategically located in the hinterlands of Basilan Island, covering a wide area that the 
locals called “Sampinit Complex.”  The camp was surrounded with several satellite 
security outposts.  Another problem was that the objective area was surrounded by 
difficult natural terrain features, i.e., a heavily dense forest on the North, a wide river on 
both the West and the South, and a commanding hill on the Eastern side.  The river posed 
the biggest obstacle for the Recon Marines, particularly for the conventional forces that 
were assigned the task of supporting the assault.  
Meanwhile, President Ramos’ exasperation was shared by the people, especially 
the local people of the province.  In the early days of the crisis, the Filipino public, 
including the religious sector rallied around the president and responded approvingly to 
the restraint he displayed in dealing with the crisis.  However, as the crisis wore on, the 
public’s impatience grew steadily, and its support for Ramos eroded.  The Ramos 
administration had been absorbing pressure from both the national and the international 
communities during the first three months of the crisis.  The pressure from various 
businesses and different religious orders for more direct action was building.  Ramos, a 
West Point graduate, and a former Chief-of Staff of AFP and Defense Secretary, was 
prepared to use the military once negotiations failed.  On the first week of May 1993, 
President Ramos ordered the military to execute the rescue mission and put an end to the 
crisis.  
Since the early part of the crisis, intelligence units were already working hard to 
acquire new information on the exact location of the hostages.  The inadequacy of the 
intelligence posed the biggest problem until the very last minute of the final planning.  
Although, the required intelligence could not specifically pin point the exact location of 
the ASG camp, the planners failed to carefully analyze the available information 
provided them. The chosen course of action called for a heavy assault.  Aside from the 
61st MC, the plan called for two Marine and two Army battalions to act as 
supporting/blocking forces in the periphery of the objective area.  The conventional 
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forces were to preposition at strategic positions around the enemy main camp while the 
61st MC was assigned to assault the main enemy camp and free the hostages.  This plan 
definitely compromised the special operations mission.  The planners did not appreciate 
the importance of the element of surprise in a hostage rescue mission.  The preparation of 
the four battalions would send signals to the ASG terrorists.  The battalions, indeed, 
violated the operational security that is very crucial in the success of any special 
operations.  
The signal to proceed with the assault was given by Brigadier General Ruiz on 
May 7, 1993 after final negotiations failed.  However, things did not go as planned.  A 
few hours into the mission, one of the Marine battalions, the 1st Marine battalion, while 
proceeding to its designated blocking position, was suddenly attacked by ASG members 
who were manning a satellite security post across the river.  The 1st Marine battalion was 
pinned down.  The ASG managed to keep the Battalion from crossing the river for almost 
two days because of their vantage positions on the other bank of the river.  
Sensing the futility of the situation, Brigadier General Ruiz gave the order to the 
61st MC to support the 1st Marine Battalion.  The 61st MC became the “supporting” 
instead of the “supported” battalion.  On May 7, 1993, the 61st MC, with only three 16-
man sections, stealthily crossed the river, infiltrating into the fortified enemy positions 
under the cover of darkness.  Once inside enemy territory, the 61st MC conducted 
observation post (OP) activities and reconnaissance of the immediate surrounding areas 
during the day in order to locate enemy-held positions and fortified bunkers.  Once they 
located the enemy, the sniper teams of the 61st MC employed the loaned sniper rifles to 
neutralize the terrorists.  On May 8, the Recon Marines engaged six armed terrorists, 
instantly killing two and wounding two others.  The effectiveness of the Recon Marine 
snipers created chaos and confusion within the ASG terrorists as indicated by their 
indiscriminate retaliatory fire.  The AFP intelligence units provided damage assessment 
to the 61st MC, by way of intercepted radio conversation and human intelligence.   
Because of their extensive special training and skills, the Recon Marines managed 
to wait patiently, under the heat of the sun, for the moment to strike again at the ASG. 
This went on for another two days deep in the ASG main camp. The deaths of the 
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terrorists manning the advance and inner security posts had tremendous psychological 
effect on the ASG.  The enemy had no idea where the Marine snipers were firing from.  
There were several other significant contributions associated with the Recon Marines 
worth mentioning with regard to the rescue operations.   
First, there was the effective calling of indirect fire support and air strikes, where 
the Recon Marines acted as forward observers for the artillery elements and provided 
effective and deadly fires.  Second, the Marine Recon acted as guides to the follow-up 
forces to guide them across safe routes, as there were reports of landmines around the 
camp.  Third, the 61st MC cleared booby traps within and around the enemy camp for the 
follow-on forces.     
Finally, on May 10, the 61st MC made their final assault on the enemy's main 
headquarters which was defended by a .50 caliber machine gun.  The Recon Marines 
maneuvered forward and delivered effective fires to the enemy until their last defense 
collapsed, forcing the remaining enemy to scamper in different directions carrying their 
dead and wounded.  The element of surprise and shock caused by the assault created 
confusion among the ASG, providing the opportunity for Father Blanco to escape from 
his captors unhurt.  Prior to Father Blanco’s escape, the younger Biel was released by the 
ASG due to the pressure exerted by the government forces against them. 
The capture of the ASG’s Camp, Al-Madinah, and the killing of 46 ASG terrorists 
greatly pressured the enemy to release the little boy, Luis Anthony Biel III.  One 50 
caliber machine gun, one light anti-tank weapon, two M2 Carbine rifle, one M1 Garand 
rifle, an undetermined number of live mortar rounds, several land mines/home-made 
bombs, and voluminous documents were recovered from the enemy camp.  The Marine 
reconnaissance unit did not incur a single casualty during the operation.  By these 
achievements, the Commanding Officer, 61st MC, Captain Parcon, was awarded the 
highest military award, the Medal of Valor.  
The success of the rescue mission had a huge psychological impact, not only on 
the ASG, but also on the government forces and the political leadership.  The morale of 
other soldiers, especially the regular troops, was lifted upon observing the result of the 
operations and the capabilities of the 61st MC.  It took the ASG a long while before it 
64 
struck again.  This was the first encounter between the government forces and the ASG, a 
testing ground that would mark the beginning for the special operations units of the AFP.  
3. Lamitan Fiasco: The Failed Rescue Mission, June 1-3, 2001 
In 1994, following the setbacks the ASG had suffered, which included the loss of 
their main camp at Isabela, Basilan, the ASG regrouped and struck once again.  
Determined to establish a tough reputation, the ASG seized their first American 
kidnapping victim, Charles Walton, a language scholar who was doing research in 
Basilan.  However, sensing that Washington would not give in, and knowing that 
Malacanang would not hesitate to repeat the same actions as it did a year earlier, Walton 
was released weeks later, without a ransom or condition of any kind.129  
In January, 1995, the ASG made headlines when it was linked to a plot to 
assassinate Pope John Paul II, who was visiting Manila at the time. Philippine security 
authorities, however, foiled the plot, rounding up several suspected foreign terrorists, 
allegedly involved with the ASG.  The Ramos administration felt relieved by the results 
of the intelligence operation against the ASG.  However, this did not last.  
On April 4, 1995, Janjalani's Basilan-based, Abu Sayyaf, reinforced by MNLF 
fighters and the MNLF “Lost Command,” attacked the bustling town of Ipil, in 
Zamboanga del Sur.  This combined group of terrorists robbed banks, shot innocent 
civilians, and set the town on fire, before fleeing with several hostages.  The daring 
daylight raid left 52 people dead and 32 others wounded, including unprepared Army 
soldiers.  The raid also left more than three hundred million pesos in damaged property 
(five million in U.S. dollars).130  The attack in Ipil reflected negatively against the 
reputation of the Ramos administration, which was scheduled to host the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Conference (APEC) summit in 1996.  Because of the menace brought by the 
ASG, the government made a policy decision to shift the focus of the AFP and made the 
ASG threat the top priority.  
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65 
The ASG became President Joseph Estrada’s biggest problem following the 
kidnappings of foreigners at a dive resort in Sipadan, Malaysia in April, 2000; and also of 
President Arroyo after the ASG abducted tourists and workers in the Dos Palmas Resort 
in Palawan, Philippines in May, 2001 (one of the case studies presented in the thesis).  
Among the hostages were three American citizens, Martin and Gracia Burnham, both 
missionaries, and Guillermo Sobero.131  Sobero was beheaded later by the ASG as a 
birthday present to President Arroyo.   
In the early morning of May 27, 2001, 20 to 30 fully armed, Abu Sayyaf terrorists 
abducted 20 foreign and local tourists at gunpoint from the Dos Palmas Beach Resort in 
Palawan.  This marked the beginning of the Dos Palmas crisis, a 376-day ordeal, which 
the newly installed Arroyo administration had to face.  The government was immediately 
placed under great pressure from the public and the international community to take 
action to end the crisis.132  The ASG raid embarrassed the government because of the 
reaction of the military.  First, the Western Command based in Palawan was not able to 
pursue the ASG after their raid.  Second, the AFP was not able to locate or identify the 
place where the terrorists might have brought their victims.  Philippine President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo appeared on national television the following day and declared an “all 
out war” on the ASG, warning them that she will “finish what you have started.”133   
On May 29, following the announcement by the President, SOUTHCOM ordered 
the 103rd Infantry Brigade of the Army to conduct search-and rescue operations at the 
municipalities of Lantawan and Tuburan, Basilan, the most probable area the ASG had 
withdrawn to.  The units tasked, however, were an ad hoc formation of two companies 
from the 55th Infantry Battalion (55th IB), 32nd Infantry Battalion (32nd IB), and a platoon 
of Special Forces.   
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On May 31, the 9th Intelligence Service Unit sent a report suggesting that 
suspected ASG terrorists on board a 70-man boat had landed at Barangay Bato-Bato, 
Tuburan, Basilan.  Upon learning of this development, SOUTHCOM again formed an ad 
hoc force, the 18th Infantry Battalion (18th IB), and a company from 32nd IB, not trained 
to undertake such sensitive operations in Tuburan, Basilan.  Moreover, higher command 
informed the Commanding Officer, 103rd Infantry Brigade (CO,103rd Brigade) that Scout 
Rangers students (SR CL 142) would be sent from Manila to Basilan to join the search 
operations.  
In the early morning on June 1, Army forces of the 18th IB and 32nd IB 
encountered approximately 100 ASG fighters at Barangay Penguengan, Tuburan, 
Basilan.  Apparently, the government forces were not able to maintain contact with the 
enemy, as directed by higher command.  With these developments, the CO, 103rd Brigade 
established a Tactical Command Post (TCP) at Campo Dos, Lamitan, Basilan, about 6 
kilometers from Poblacion Lamitan. 
At about 0100 hours on June 2, the Non-Commissioned Officer-in-Charge 
(NCOIC) of an 18th IB outpost at Poblacion Lamitan informed the Brigade TCP of 
gunfire near their vicinity.  The gunfire was between a group of Civilian Volunteer 
Organization (CVOs)134 and an element of the ASG.  The ASG had come from Tuburan 
and managed to enter the Dr. Jose Torres Memorial Hospital-St. Peter’s Church 
compound at Poblacion Lamitan by posing as soldiers with wounded comrades.  Upon 
receiving the report, troops under the command of Major Eliseo Campued, Executive 
Officer of 18th IB, and Captain Acierto, the intelligence and operations officer of the 
103rd Brigade, proceeded to the 18th IB outpost in order to find out what had transpired.  
Immediately after receiving the briefing, Major Campued and some troops proceeded to 
the hospital to verify the report, but were subjected to heavy enemy fire, prompting them 
to pull back to the 18th IB outpost.  
Meanwhile, as the gun battle was erupting, the first unit of the Scout Ranger, 
students of Class 142, and their training staffs, headed by Captain Ruben Guinolbay, had 
arrived in Lamitan Wharf at around 0220 hours on June 2.  They had no knowledge of the 
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situation at Poblacion Lamitan.  The 103rd Brigade failed to inform other troops in the 
vicinity, particularly the convoy of Scout Rangers that was expected to pass along the 
route where the incident was happening.  As a result, the ASG ambushed the Scout 
Rangers on board two M35 trucks while they passed in front of the St. Peter’s Church, 
killing two and wounding eight. Moreover, as indicated in the Inspector General’s official 
report,  
SR troops and elements at the outpost fired at/engaged each other.  At 
about 0530 hours, Captain Guinolbay spotted and approached the V-150 
Commando armored vehicle at the 18th IB outpost and requested 
assistance to evacuate his casualties.  It was only at this time that SR CL 
142 and 103rd Brigade elements learned of their disposition, which then 
consolidated at the 18 IB outpost.”135   
After the Scout Rangers linked up with the 18th IB, the Scout Rangers were 
ordered by Captain Guinolbay to position themselves at the back of the compound in 
order to block the possible escape route of the ASG, while the 18th IB elements under 
Major Campued positioned themselves in the front of the compound.  At 0830 hours on 
June 02, the troops in front of the compound tried to assault it, but were repulsed by the 
ASG who were well positioned inside the compound.  This prompted the government 
forces to retreat to their previous location.  In the process of the assault, one military 
troop was killed in action (KIA) and another was wounded.  Earlier in the morning, the 
CO of the 103rd Brigade had tried to link up with the troops at the hospital, but was also 
subjected to enemy sniper fire.  Thus, he, too, was forced to return to his TCP at Campo 
Dos.   
It was at this point that the CO of the 103rd Brigade ordered the bulk of the 18th 
IB, which was operating at nearby Tuburan town, to proceed to Poblacion Lamitan.  This 
order, however, was later rescinded by the AFP Chief of Staff.136  CSAFP suggested to 
the CO of the 18th IB that it could function as a diversionary force to ease the pressure in 
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Tuburan.137  The CO, 18th IB was, instead, redirected to proceed north of Tuburan and 
clear Barangay Semut, where some 10 abducted fishermen had been recovered.138    
At 1000 hours on June 02, three hostages had managed to escape from the 
compound.139  The three were then taken into custody and interrogated by Major 
Campued.  The information divulged  by the escaped hostages suggested that: 1) the main 
ASG fighters were inside, including its top leaders, Khaddafy Janjalani and Abu Sabaya, 
2) the group came from Barangay Semut, having ridden a passenger jeep to the hospital, 
3) the hostages were holed up in the right wing of the hospital, 4) the ASG intended to 
burn the town of Lamitan in order to embarrass President Arroyo, and 5) the ASG 
strength inside was approximately 30 to 50 fighters.140  The escapees also mentioned that 
there were still 17 hostages remaining at the hospital building.  It was only then that the 
government forces learned that the ASG elements inside the compound were the main 
forces.  
Meanwhile, at around the same time, the commanding general of the 1st Infantry 
Division (CG, 1st ID) informed CO, 103rd Brigade that the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines Counter-Terrorist Force (AFP CTF)141 and a Marine company were on there 
way, and would be arriving within two hours.  The CG, 1st ID likewise instructed CO, 
103rd Brigade to take the compound by sundown.142  
Several other troops, equipped with armored vehicles (AVs), began arriving in the 
area; two armored vehicles arrived at around 1300 hours, June 2 and a second group of 
Scout Rangers students, this one 35 man-strong, arrived later, at around 1430 hours, 
immediately linking up with the first group of Scout Rangers.  At 1500 hours of the same 
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day, two platoons from the 55th IB arrived without a single officer leading them.  The 
platoons were immediately deployed at the rear of the hospital by Captain Guinolbay.   
The CO, 18th IB, communicated to the 103rd Brigade after their operation in 
Tuburan, requesting to proceed to Lamitan to reinforce the hapless force there.  Their 
march to Poblacion Lamitan, he added, would only take them two hours.  However, this 
request was put on hold by Captain Acierto, who suggested that the situation was under 
control.   
After receiving reports that the ASG were trying to break out from the compound, 
volunteer troops under Captain Guinolbay, onboard two AVs, proceeded to St. Peter’s 
Church to preemptively keep the ASG from escaping.  Heavy fire, however, prevented 
the troops from dismounting the AVs.  Again, the ASG forced the military to pull back.  
In their second attempt to assault, at around 1700 hours, one of the AVs was hit by an 
enemy rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), killing its officer and one crewmember.  The 
neutralization of the AV devastated the morale of the troops.  Their assaults had, again, 
been repulsed by the ASG.   
The AFP CTF arrived in Lamitan late in the afternoon of June 2, while the main 
body of the AFP CTF and Marine contingent arrived at around 2100 hours on June 02.  
After sundown, while the Brigade was planning and preparing for another assault, the 
ASG unleashed heavy volumes of fire, which was believed to have signaled their escape 
from the compound.  Apparently, only a few CVOs were positioned nearby to block the 
ASG withdrawal.  In the process, a gunbattle between the ASG and the CVOs ensued, 
resulting in the escape of five hostages.  These hostages remained at the house of a CVO 
until the next day, at which time they were turned over to the military.143    
The final assault was carried out by an ad hoc force comprised of many units, 
including the AFP CTF, one Marine company, and the members of Scout Rangers, Class 
142.  At around 0100 hours on June 03, the combined, ad hoc forces launched what 
proved to be its final assault on the compound.  There was little resistance, such that they 
were able to occupy their objective by 0230 hours.  The troops tasked to carry out the 
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assault had not been trained to fight in an urban environment, such as that presented by 
the compound.  Since they were not organized, trained, and equipped for this type of 
warfare, the task became difficult for the troops.  According to the Inspector General’s 
report, “Troops were hesitant to fire directly at the buildings and houses.  Our troops 
were at a loss on how to advance in urbanized terrain where walls, fences and buildings 
are present.”144   
As a result, neither dead ASG terrorists, nor any hostages were to be found.  After 
the retaking of the compound, the military forces failed to conduct a hot-pursuit operation 
against the fleeing ASG.  The compound was declared cleared by dawn.  Ironically, the 
pursuit operation the following day was temporarily halted because the troops were 
utilized to secure Poblacion Lamitan for visiting national government officials, military 
top brass, and other VIPs who came to inspect the incident area.  
The occupation of the hospital-church compound in Lamitan by the ASG had, 
indeed, been bold and daring.  The military in the area had been taken totally by surprise 
by the raid. The forces on the ground also had significant tactical lapses.  Because of 
these lapses, the ASG, together with four additional, new hostages, managed to escape.145  
The June 1-3, 2001 incident, later to be known as the “Lamitan Fiasco,” has 
turned out to be one of the greatest debacles in Philippine military history.  The ill-fated 
hostage rescue mission immediately appeared in the headlines of major national and 
international newspapers, thereby seizing the attention of lawmakers.  Following the 
failed operation, Congress called for an inquiry to probe into the incident in order to 
determine the causes to ensure that this would not happen again.  Congress also wanted to 
see that future special operations were conducted more wisely and with a greater chance 
of ending successfully.  Reports of military collusion with the ASG served to further 
complicate the matter.   
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C. ANALYSIS  
The missions discussed here conducted by Force X, 61st MC, and the ad hoc force 
in Lamitan, were strategic in nature, clearly falling into the realm of special operations.  
In this situation, the involvement of the higher leadership underscores the sensitivity of 
the operations.  The Lamitan incident suggests that the failure of certain operations might 
result in the embarrassment of the government, both nationally and internationally.  The 
strategic goal of each of these operations was to positively influence the course of the 
conflict and, ultimately, of its outcome.  For example, the operations of Force X in 
central Luzon, to target top leadership of the Huks, greatly contributed to the early 
resolution of the Huk rebellion.  While the successful rescue operations by the Marines of 
Father Blanco and Luis Anthony Biel from the hands of the ASG won back the trust and 
confidence of the people towards the government.  Moreover, it demonstrated the Ramos 
administration’s resolve to fight terrorism.  Furthermore, the subsequent capture of the 
main camp of the ASG denied them a safe haven and sanctuary in which to train and plan 
future terrorist actions.   
All of the operations examined in this study have demonstrated that special 
operations are neither easy, nor simple to conduct.  For example, all Force X personnel 
were carefully screened for the suitability of individual troops.  They all underwent a 
rigorous training designed to infiltrate Huk ranks.  The approach of the AFP, in order to 
achieve a startling effect on the Huk rebels, had been unorthodox.   
The cases that were examined, including the Lamitan incident, also showcased the 
two most important categories of the military utility of special operations.  Colin Gray 
suggested several strategic uses of special operations, however, two are the most 
significant functions of special operations, namely: 1) economy of force and 2) expansion 
of choice for military and political leaders.146  Special operations, according to Gray, can 
achieve significant results with limited forces, and are relatively inexpensive (in terms of 
money) and comparatively low cost in casualties, as well, and come out favorably when 
overall resources expended are set against the results achieved.147  For example, Force X 
was composed of less than a hundred officers and men when it conducted “Large Unit 
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Infiltration” operations against the Huk guerrillas.  However, Force X’s operations were 
particularly effective, in that their strategic objective of neutralizing top leadership paid 
off when the Huks finally accepted defeat.  In the case of the 61st MC, they were able to 
influence or change the course of the rescue mission with less than fifty Marines.  
The special operations examined demonstrated that the special units here acted as 
force multipliers for conventional AFP forces.  Force multiplier is defined as “a 
capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases 
the combat potential of that force and, thus, enhances the probability of successful 
mission accomplishment.”148   
The Force X and 61st MC operations illustrate this point well.  For example, the 
61st MC performed this function when it supported the 1st Marine Battalion and Army 
infantry battalions that were involved in the 1993 hostage rescue operations in Basilan.  
Because of the small number of men in the 61st MC, it was able to release the pressure of 
the ASG attack against the 1st Marine Battalion in the early phases of the mission.  The 
use of Force X during the Huk campaign, in a similar way, had not only been good for 
gathering intelligence, insertion, deception, etc., but it also undermined the “trust culture” 
within the Huk organization and, ultimately, helped break their will to fight.  This would 
not have been possible by only utilization regular, conventional forces of the AFP. 
These special units have also accelerated the pace of the military’s success.  The 
special operations conducted by Force X were crucial to the counter-insurgency 
campaign of the newly independent Philippine government.  Force X operations greatly 
contributed to the Hook’s decision to accept an amnesty offered by the Philippine 
government in the following years.  According to Abueva, 
Most noteworthy was the modus operandi of specially trained Scout 
Ranger teams within the BCTs, penetrated into Huk hideouts in the Sierra 
Madre and Zambales mountains. They usually spearhead the large scale 
attacks, pinpointed enemy concentrations and camps, assessed the effects 
of air strikes, and destroy small enemy formations. There was also the 
Undercover Patrol which disguises as civilians or as Huks. Third, was the 
Mountain Patrol, consisting not more than 24 men. The patrol penetrates 
the mountains and forest, being small enough to move quietly and fast, but 
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large enough to engage the guerrilla band. Finally, the Large Unit 
Infiltration, a most delicate and risky operation.149    
The heightened abilities of the armed forces in special operations units proved 
invaluable in the overall counter-insurgency program of President Ramon Magsaysay.  
The Army pursued the rebels in the mountains as never before, increasing the pressure on 
guerrillas until they were exhausted.  “Soldiers pursued Huks where they had not before 
and did so with fewer abuses against the villagers.”150  According to a former rebel, “We 
spent more and more of our time just trying to elude the soldiers and trying to get enough 
food and ammunition to stay alive.”151  Force X performed tasks that regular, 
conventional forces failed to perform.  Their success suggested that insurgents, who have 
advantages in both knowledge of the terrain and intelligence, can be outfought on their 
own terms, thereby denying the enemy of its supposed superiority in terms of troop 
morale.  
In the case of the Lamitan incident, had the AFP acted appropriately, i.e., utilized 
special operations units like the AFP CTF, the ASG could have been defeated earlier.  In 
her book entitled, In the Presence of my Enemies, Gracia Burnham confirmed that most 
of the top level leaders of the ASG were with the other fighters inside the compound.  
The failure of the AFP to cordon off the ASG and rescue the hostages in Lamitan, not 
only tarnished the image of the military establishment, but also the highest office of the 
land.  For example, the failure of the AFP to rescue the hostages and capture or kill the 
ASG triggered suspicion of collusion of the military and the ASG, prompting the Senate 
to investigate the Lamitan incident.152  Moreover, the Arroyo administration was also 
suspected of negotiating with the ASG, or paying ransoms, for the release of the 
hostages.   
Notwithstanding the risks that a failed hostage rescue mission might bring upon 
the national reputation of the Philippines, the Arroyo administration allowed an ad hoc 
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force to conduct the rescue mission, instead of the AFP CTF.  The Lamitan incident 
called for special warfare activity, as did the situation in central Luzon, where Force X 
and the 61st MC had intervened in Basilan..  
The special operations units examined also increased the options available to 
political and military leaders of the Philippines at the time.  For example, the Force X 
special operations in the 1940’s facilitated the neutralization of key Huk leaders, deemed 
crucial at that time for tipping the balance of the conflict in favor of the Philippine 
government.  In the case of President Ramos in the 1990’s, the government could not 
have successfully resolved the crisis merely by resorting to the ordinary use of military 
force.  When negotiations for the release of the hostages failed, Ramos still had the 
option to resolve the crisis by physical coercion.  The availability of a special operations 
capability, not only enhanced the flexibility of the political leaders, but also the 
commanders in the field.  The unique capabilities of special operations units provided the 
Philippine government with options other than the use of direct action, as evidenced by 
the cases examined.  The Lamitan incident, however, was a different story; it was a 
disaster because of some problems in special operations in the AFP today and because of 
misuse of special operations and special operations units.   
The Lamitan incident can provide a picture of some of the problem areas in the 
conduct of special operations missions in the Philippines.  It is a case where the defense 
and military leadership fail to provide proper guidance as to how to best prosecute special 
operations.  Moreover, there was neither proper oversight, nor the necessary control 
arrangements regarding the most effective conduct of special operations units in place.  
Furthermore, the case is an example where ad hoc forces are not sufficient to deal with 
situations that call for special warfare activity.   
Among the problems identified in the special report of the Army Inspector 
General  (IG)  regarding  the  incident  were: 1) poor  coordination, 2)  lack of  training in  
urban environment, 3) failure of command and control, 4) insufficient number of tactical 
units in the area, and 5) inappropriate intervention of higher military leadership in 
mission execution.   
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A variety of poorly coordinated problems marred both the preparations and the 
execution of the operation in Lamitan.  The lack of communication equipment has been 
one source of difficulties frequently cited; prior to the arrival of the AFP CTF, only three 
hand-held radios were available during the encounter at Poblacion Lamitan.153  The 
Scout Rangers had no communication equipment at all, resulting in their being ambushed 
following their arrival, and also their bad encounter with the elements of 103rd Brigade.  
This same predicament, i.e., of a lack of radios, hampered coordination between the 
armor units and foot soldiers during the combined assaults.  Additionally, the lack of 
communications equipment made coordination more difficult between the ground troops 
and the Air Force MG 520 helicopters that were supporting the operations.    
Another major cause for coordination problems encountered in the operation was 
the ad hoc nature of the forces in planning and executing the mission.  Rather than being 
efficiently coordinated, the force was a collection of disparate units.154  Thus, the force 
was not a cohesively team forged through extensive training.  In comparison, the Force X 
underwent extensive training that emphasized strong unit cohesion, prior to their 
operations.  Teamwork is essential in special operations, and its absence may lead to 
disaster, as suggested by this rescue mission.  Troops hesitated to maneuver during the 
height of the siege because Captain Guinolbay, who belonged to a different unit, the 1st 
Scout Ranger Regiment, was the one giving orders to 18th IB and 55th IB.  The operating 
troops were not familiar with each other and had difficulties understanding one another’s 
standing operating procedures (SOP).  
In most instances, the AFP has the tendency to set up task forces instead of using 
existing commands to plan and execute special operations.  The draw back of this 
approach, according to Lucien Vandenbroucke155, is that “it makes it harder for those 
entrusted with the mission to enlist the assistance of other organizational units, both 
within and outside the military because ad hoc task forces lack regular, long-standing ties 
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to these organizations.”156  The ad hoc nature of the force that composed the rescue force 
in Lamitan was a key ingredient to its breakdown at the command and control levels.    
Command and control was another problem during the failed hostage rescue 
mission.  Effective command and control at the operational level is essential for the 
successful conduct of special operations.  In the Lamitan incident, observance of proper 
chain of command in issuing orders was violated.  For example, the decision of CO, 103rd 
Brigade to shift his forces from Tuburan to Lamitan had been rescinded by higher 
command.  The tactical units and the 103rd Brigade’s intelligence and operations officer 
had no continuous contact between one another because of the lack of communications 
equipment.  “The officers and men were unnecessarily exposed to risk by running and 
crawling to different positions just to direct and coordinate the maneuvers,” according to 
the report of the IG.  Moreover, the presence of the ground commander was not felt 
during the operation.  CO, 103rd Brigade had positioned his TCP in Campo Dos which 
was several kilometers away from Poblacion Lamitan not until mid-morning of the 
following day, when the ASG and hostages were confirmed to be inside the compound.  
His decision to remain in Campo Dos was a result of inadequate intelligence.  He thought 
all along that he was confronting two fronts, one in Lamitan and one in Tuburan, where 
the bulk of troops were positioned.  His instructions to his operations officer were being 
issued by way of radio only.  The special report adds:  
With a very fluid tactical situation where decisions kept changing every now and 
then, his absence in the 18th IB outpost created anachronistic set-up where a consensual 
decision was being arrived at by the Brigade S2/3 (a captain), a Battalion executive 
officer (rank of major) and the course director of SR CL 142 (a captain).  The physical 
presence of the Brigade Commander at the outpost could or may have made a difference 
in the tactical decisions and behavior of the troops coming from different units (Brigade 
HQ personnel, 55th IB, 18th IB, and SR CL 142).157       
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The special report also suggests that the troops involved in Lamitan lacked 
training in urban warfare that included the Scout Ranger students.  Urban warfare is not 
extensively taught in most training schools.  The Army infantry battalions in Basilan had 
not undergone extensive training is this kind of operation.  Moreover, the units on the 
ground were not properly organized and equipped to conduct such a kind of mission.  
Urban warfare, specifically building assaults, requires special skills, equipment, weapons, 
and extensive training and experience.  The ASG effectively made use of the compound 
as a stronghold.  The troops were at a loss regarding how to advance in urbanized terrain 
where walls, fences, and building were present.   
Another finding of the IG was the lack of troops on the ground.  The troops were 
concentrated in other parts of Basilan.  The bulk of the troops of 18th IB were operating in 
Tuburan when the Lamitan incident broke out.  Apparently, the order of CO, 103rd 
Brigade for 18th IB to reinforce the troops in Lamitan was rescinded by higher command.  
Although, the probability for a successful rescue mission was still questionable, the 
number of troops (100+: 14) on the ground was more than enough to have prevented the 
ASG, at the least, from escaping.  
The “Lamitan Fiasco” could have been avoided had there been a stand-by special 
operations unit with robust special operations capabilities positioned in the SOUTHCOM 
operational area.  The AFP CTF should have been pre-positioned in the island province 
for any occurrence immediately after the raid in Palawan.  According to one of the 
inquiries after the incident, there is a suggestion that the failure of the AFP CTF to arrive 
within a two hours period (that was promised by the Chief of Staff, the AFP) was one of 
the causes for the escape of the Abu Sayyaf.158 
A final finding was the intervention in mission execution by higher military 
headquarters in the operation, as it unfolded, had been inappropriate.  Because of the high 
visibility and the high stakes involved in this case, higher authorities felt they needed to 
get involved.  For example, the order of CO, 103rd Brigade for the 18th IB to reinforce 
him was rescinded by higher command.  The 18th IB was, instead, ordered to wait for the 
AFP CTF.  The Chief of Staff by-passed three command levels: SOUTHCOM, 1st 
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Infantry Division/ Task Force “Comet”, and 103rd Brigade.159  Because of this, the 
commanders on the ground lost the initiative to prosecute the operations.   
Based upon the facts of the case, one can observe that the IG failed to bring out 
three important factors to ensure that special operations are successful: 1) adequate 
intelligence upon what the objective is, and who the enemy is, 2) a force trained, 
equipped, and organized to conduct special operations, and 3) a sound doctrine for 
special operations.  The IG findings failed to identify that there was inadequate 
intelligence, too.  The lack of intelligence was a critical factor in the Lamitan incident.  
The inadequacy of intelligence resulted in the failure of the commanders to anticipate the 
most probable course of action of the ASG.   
Moreover, a healthy appreciation of intelligence could have resulted in the pre-
positioning of AFP CTF in Basilan area, the most probable place where the terrorists 
might bring their captives.  Additionally, had the military immediately known that the 
ASG was inside the compound, the government forces could have focused their limited 
resources around the objective until the arrival of AFP CTF.  The reports of diversionary 
attacks by ASG at other towns greatly contributed to the indecisiveness of CO, 103rd 
Brigade.  The facts of the case suggest that the identity and composition of the ASG were 
actually known only after the battle had been going on for eight hours.  The hostages who 
escaped were the ones who confirmed that the main ASG group was in the compound.  
According to the IG, “The sudden appearance of ASG in Lamitan deceived government 
forces of their whereabouts.  With this information, maximum resources of the military 
should have been brought to the location with urgency, to the extent of commandeering 
civilian air and sea transportation to insert forces.”160     
The AFP, at the time of the Lamitan incident, already had a dedicated force for 
combating terrorism—i.e., the AFT CTF.  However, there was no established doctrine to 
guides its proper use.  There was also lack of guidance as to who had the responsibility to 
prosecute strategic special operations.  For example, following the raid of the ASG in 
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Palawan, SOUTHCOM failed to request for the services of the AFP CTF from higher 
command to pre-position the AFP CTF to SOUTHCOM area of operations, the most 
probable withdrawal route of the ASG.  Moreover, SOUTHCOM conducted its own 
operations to locate and rescue the hostages, utilizing troops that were not organized, 
trained, and equipped for counterterrorism activity.  It conducted strategic special 
operations, utilizing disparate forces under its command.  This clearly shows that the 



























































The examination of the unique security environment of the Philippines presented 
in Chapter II suggests that the internal threats, specifically those posed by insurgencies, 
secessionist groups, and terrorists groups (e.g., the CPP/NPA, the MILF, and the ASG), 
should be the number one priority of the AFP.  The Philippine government recognizes 
that defeating the internal security threats involves a comprehensive solution.  However, 
it is essential to destroy the armed components of these threat groups so that long term 
solutions brought in by other government agencies could be implemented effectively. 
The LCM threat among the internal threat groups remains the top priority of the 
government.  It has retained its politico-military capability and nationwide influence 
which resulted in the AFP having primary responsibility for internal security operations.  
On the other hand, the threat posed by the MILF and ASG is quite manageable.  MILF 
and ASG activities remain isolated in Muslim dominated areas in central and southern 
Mindanao where they enjoy popular support.  The MILF and the government are having 
peace talks aimed to end the three-decade of fighting.  The ASG, however, has been 
weakened to a great degree by the death and capture of its key leaders, and the continued 
military operations by the AFP.  The ASG’s capability to recuperate, however, should not 
be downplayed or underestimated.  The ASG’s link to international terrorist network 
groups, like al Qaeda and JI, increases its potential to grow and build up its strengths and 
capabilities.   
These internal threat groups will continue to fight unconventionally, using 
guerrilla warfare as a method, and to maintain the conflict in the lower-intensity 
spectrum.  Their strategy, for the most part, will be to engage the AFP asymmetrically.  
These groups do not have the capacity to engage the government forces conventionally. 
Thus, they will likely continue their strategy of attrition, which is to exhaust the 
government forces over time.  Moreover, the nature of the conflict will continue to 
become less defined and more dispersed.  Therefore, as these internal threat groups 
remain to embrace the strategy of attrition and continue to become less defined and more 
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dispersed, it is inevitable that the AFP will remain to operate at the lower end of the 
spectrum, specifically employing Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) strategies.   
The AFP needs to have the capabilities to operate at the lower end of the 
spectrum.  As the nature of the conflict stays on this course, the AFP must enhance its 
special operations capabilities and transform its forces to better fit the current internal 
threat as well as future challenges.    
The rescue operations in Lamitan, Basilan has demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
AFP in the field of special operations.  The operations in Basilan, designed to locate and 
rescue the hostages, was politically sensitive deploying  only the best equipped and most 
proficient Philippine military forces, in order to avoid possible mission failure that can 
result in damaging Philippine prestige and interest.  The Philippine Army Inspector 
General’s report concluded that the failure of the rescue mission can be attributed to:  1) 
poor coordination, 2) lack of training in urban environment, 3) failure of command and 
control, 4) insufficient number of tactical units in the area, and 5) inappropriate 
intervention of higher military leadership in mission execution.   
After further examination, however, three other important factors were identified 
that can be attributed to the failure of the rescue mission.  The first, and most important 
factor, is the inadequate intelligence about the enemy and its objective.  This resulted in 
the failure of AFP leadership and the commanders on the ground to anticipate the courses 
of action and capabilities of the ASG.  Second, is the absence of an established doctrine 
and strategy for the use of special operations.  The lack of guidance and oversight 
allowed commanders to misuse special operations forces and apply special operations 
without the benefit of its main purpose.  The lack of established special operations 
doctrine allowed military commanders to utilitize ad hoc units in conducting special 
operations missions, as evidenced by the Lamitan fiasco.  Lastly, there is neither an 
established unified special operations force in the AFP that has the responsibility and 
mission to conduct special operations nor a force that is organized, trained, and equipped 
to conduct strategic special operations.  Each branch of service has their own special 
operations unit designed to support their own operational needs.   
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The first two case studies in Chapter V have demonstrated that the AFP had 
utilized special operations forces correctly.  The analysis highlighted some essential 
elements for a successful conduct of special operations, which are: 1) a force trained, 
equipped, and organized to conduct special operations; 2) effective command, control, 
communications, and intelligence support at the operational level; 3) clear national and 
theater strategic objectives; and 4) competent tactical planning and execution.   
Special operations have contributed immensely to past AFP combat operations.  
The operations by Force X and the 61st Marine Company positively influenced the course 
and the outcome of the conflict.  The operations that were conducted by Force X during 
the Philippine Huk campaign tipped the balance of the conflict in favor of the 
government.  Equally significant, was the role of the 61st Marine Company during the 
rescue operations in Basilan in 1993.  These Philippine special operations forces have 
increased the choices of options available to political and military leaders of the 
Philippines, as evidenced by the Huk campaign experience of the Philippine government.  
The availability of a special operations capability not only enhanced the flexibility of the 
political leaders, but also the commanders in the field.  The unique capabilities of special 
operations units provided the Philippine government with options of direct actions as 
evidenced by the cases.  Without the contributions of the special operations forces and its 
capabilities, the internal threat groups could have stepped-up their activities and 
expanded their forces until the Philippine central government collapsed.   
The case studies have also provided insights into the real nature of special 
operations: Special operations are neither easy nor simple to conduct.  Ad hoc and 
disparate units of Philippine conventional forces cannot perform such operations.  Special 
operations demands that personnel are carefully screened and trained, properly organized, 
and well equipped.  Furthermore, the study has showcased two most important strategic 
utility of special operations, namely: economy of force and expansion of choice.   
The AFP has benefited from the dividends of special operations.  Force X’s 
operations were particularly effective against the Huks.  It proved that limited forces can 
achieve significant results.  Special operations proved to be relatively low in cost in terms 
of casualties and the expended resources set against the results achieved.   
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The study has shown that special operations forces can act as force multipliers for 
the rest of the AFP.  The Force X and the 61st MC operations have illustrated this point.  
For example, they augmented the strength of the regular conventional forces of the AFP.  
Also, the use of special operations forces undermined the vulnerability of the internal 
threat groups.  Force X operations have accelerated the pace of military success.  The 
successful conduct of special operations during the Huk campaign greatly contributed to 
the decision of the Huks to accept an amnesty offered by the Philippine government in 
1954.  
The assessment in Chapter III suggests that the current AFPSOF capabilities are 
lacking in, not only enhancement, but also in the synchronization of their missions and 
capabilities.  AFPSOF should, first and foremost, formulate a joint doctrine that will 
define their missions and capabilities and delineate its command and control system.  
Moreover, the doctrine should give emphasis to the strategic or operational utility of 
special operations.  Given that almost the entire AFP is dedicated to the internal security 
operations of the country, the AFPSOF should possess capabilities that are distinct from 
the conventional forces and applicable to all the threats of the country and encompassing 
the range of military operations, i.e, war and military operations other than war 
(MOOTW).  
AFPSOF should posses or enhance its capabilities in the following:  intelligence 
operations, unconventional warfare, civil affairs and psychological operations, close air 
support and air mobility, maritime and riverine operations, urban operations, and 
information operations.  The failures of past military operations where SOF were utilized, 
whether against terrorist groups or insurgents, indicate that intelligence was among its 
weaknesses.  The AFP intelligence units, for instance, were always at a loss and could not 
track the ASG during the Dos Palmas incident and similar other operations against the 
ASG.  The military commanders in Basilan were totally surprised when the kidnappers 
appeared with their hostages in the populous town of Lamitan.  Military units were 
hunting the kidnappers somewhere else when the ASG appeared in Lamitan.  The ability 
of the military intelligence units to locate the enemies of the state and foresee its 
activities and intentions had been a perennial problem in the AFP. 
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As the LCM continues to be the primary threat of the country, capabilities in 
unconventional warfare, civil affairs, psychological operations, and direct actions need to 
be enhanced.  It is evident in the AFP’s past campaigns and other models of 
counterinsurgency that military operations by itself, especially when conducted in a 
conventional fashion, do not succeed.  Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay’s strategy 
during the Huk campaign in the 1950s was successful, but failure of the succeeding 
administrations to sustain the non-military dimension of the campaign resulted in the 
insurgent’s resurgence in the late 1960s.  
Another example of the Philippine government’s failure to sustain the military 
gains against the LCM was the success of the AFP campaign plan, “Lambat Bitag,”161 in 
the late 1980s.  Here, the AFP effectively reduced the LCM members from 30,000 to 
about 6,000, and this trend of declining insurgent activities continued.  However, the 
inability of the government to compliment the military’s resulted, once again, in the 
resurgence of the LCM in the mid 1990s.  Though the non-military portion of a 
counterinsurgency campaign is spearheaded by organizations of the civil government, the 
military has the critical task of linking, collaborating, and synchronizing the activities.  
Thus, the capabilities of the AFPSOF needs enhancement.  
Chapter III makes it clear that the Air Force component of AFPSOF has a limited 
capability in air mobility and close air support.  Enhancing these essential capabilities 
will entail much funding, and will likely be by-passed by the Philippine government due 
to the economic difficulty it is currently experiencing.  This enhancement could be 
achieved, however, through prioritizing capabilities and equipment that will directly 
enhance AFPSOF operations.  Maritime and riverine operations, on the other hand, are of 
paramount consideration for AFP special operations.  Because the Philippines is an 
archipelago, being comprised of more than 7,000 islands and islets, this adds to the 
complexity of the internal security operations.  Enhanced maritime and riverine 
operations capabilities of AFPSOF would greatly improve its effectiveness. 
                                                 
161 Literal translation: Fishnet Trap. Letter of Instruction 23-88 dated 16 September 1988, sets forth 
the AFP campaign plan for a general offensive against the Communist Party of the Philippines, its military 
arm the New People’s Army, and the legal front the National Democratic Front, commonly referred to as 
CPP/NPA/NDF. 
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Finally, the threat of terrorism requires the AFPSOF to enhance its capabilities in 
direct action missions, urban operations and information operations.  This will require the 
enhancement of skills and equipment.  Emphasis should be given to computer network 
operations and electronic warfare of the information operations missions. 
This study concludes that the following core missions, derived from the U.S. 
Special Operations Forces: direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, 
counterterrorism, civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and information 
operations, are relevant, adaptable, and responsive to the security requirements of the 
Philippine government.  Collateral activities would include: combat readiness assessment 
and training (CRAT), combat search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and special 
activities.  Some of these missions, however, should be redefined to fit with the 
Philippine government national objectives. 
The capabilities that AFPSOF should posses include command and control 
systems at strategic and operational levels, urban operations, maritime and riverine 
operations, close air support and air mobility in all terrain and adverse weather 


























anti-surface air operations. An air operation conducted in an air/sea environment 
against enemy surface forces. (JP 1-02) 
 
armed reconnaissance. A mission with the primary purpose of locating and attacking 
targets of opportunity, i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities, in assigned general 
areas or along assigned ground communications routes, and not for the purpose of 
attacking specific briefed targets. (JP 1-02) 
 
campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing 
a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02) 
 
civilian internee. 1. A civilian who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for 
security reasons or for protection or because he or she has committed an offense against 
the detaining power. 2. A term to refer to persons interned and protected in accordance 
with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention). Also called CI. (JP 1-02) 
 
civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 
influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-
governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a 
friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to 
consolidate and achieve operational objectives. Civil-military operations may include 
performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of 
local, regional, or national government. These activities may also occur prior to, during, 
or subsequent to other military actions. They may occur, if directed, in the absence of 
other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil 
affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also 
called CMO. (JP 1-02) 
 
clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental 
departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine 
operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the 
operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, 
an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational 
considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02) 
 
close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that 
are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air 
mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02) 
 
conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear 
weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02) 
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covert operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity 
of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine 
in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on 
concealment of the operation. (JP 1-02) 
 
deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, 
or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the 
enemy’s interests. (JP 1-02) 
 
dislocated civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an 
expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also 
called DC. (JP 1-02) 
 
force multiplier. A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, 
significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the 
probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02) 
 
guerilla force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized 
along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, 
hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02) 
 
guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or 
hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW. (JP 1-02) 
 
hydrographic reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of an area of water to determine depths, 
beach gradients, the nature of the bottom, and the location of coral reefs, rocks, shoals, 
and manmade obstacles. (JP 1-02) 
 
information assurance. Information operations that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 
Also called IA. (JP 1-02) 
 
insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government 
through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 
 
interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military 
potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (JP 1-02) 
 
joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified 
commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command 
(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02) 
 
low visibility operation. Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions 
inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; 
actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. 
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Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or 
sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (JP 1-
02) 
 
military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military 
capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions 
can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national 
power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02) 
 
paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any 
country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02) 
 
poststrike reconnaissance. Missions undertaken for the purpose of gathering 
information used to measure results of a strike. (JP 1-02) 
 
public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community 
relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in 
the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02) 
 
recovery operations. Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and 
return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (JP 1-02) 
 
riverine area. An inland or coastal area comprising both land and water, characterized 
by limited land lines of communication, with extensive water surface and/or inland 
waterways that provide natural routes for surface transportation and communications. (JP 
1-02) 
 
riverine operations. Operations conducted by forces organized to cope with and exploit 
the unique characteristics of a riverine area, to locate and destroy hostile forces, and/or to 
achieve or maintain control of the riverine area. Joint riverine operations combine land, 
naval, and air operations, as appropriate, and are suited to the nature of the specific 
riverine area in which operations are to be conducted. (JP 1-02)  
 
sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national 
defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or 
destroy, any national defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and 
natural resources. (JP 1-02) 
 
special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives 
employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force 
requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility 
capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. 
They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional 
forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by 
indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in 
degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, 
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independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence 
and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02) 
 
special tactics. US Air Force special operations forces organized, trained, and equipped 
to conduct special operations. They include combat control team, pararescue, and combat 
weather personnel who provide the interface between air and ground combat operations. 
Also called ST. (JP 1-02) 
 
special tactics team. A task-organized element of special tactics that may include 
combat control, pararescue, and combat weather personnel. Functions include austere 
airfield and assault zone reconnaissance, surveillance, establishment, and terminal 
control; terminal attack control; combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and 
evacuation staging; and tactical weather observations and forecasting. Also called STT. 
(JP 1-02) 
 
subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or 
political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02) 
 
terminal attack control. The authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons 
release clearance to attacking aircraft. (JP 1-02) 
 
terminal guidance. 1. The guidance applied to a guided missile between midcourse 
guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target. 2. Electronic, mechanical, visual, or 
other assistance given an aircraft pilot to facilitate arrival at, operation within or over, 
landing upon, or departure from an air landing or airdrop facility. 3. Any electronic, 
mechanical, voice or visual communication that provides approaching aircraft or 
weapons additional information regarding a specific location or target. Terminal guidance 
is not a type of air control. Those providing terminal guidance do not have weapons 
release authority, or authority to direct the maneuver off aircraft. (JP 1-02)  
 
terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of 
goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02) 
 
unconventional assisted recovery. Evader recovery conducted by directed 
unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional 
assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine 
organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly 
control. Also called UAR. (JP 1-02) 
 
weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction 
and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large number of people. Weapons of 
mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological 
weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such 






ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
AFP    Armed Forces of the Philippines 
AFPSOF   Armed Forces of the Philippines special operations forces 
AFSOC   Air Force Special Operations Command 
AFSOF   Air Force special operations forces 
ARSOA   Army special operations aviation 
ARSOF   Army special operations forces 
ARSOTF   Army special operations task force 
ASG    Abu Sayyaf Group 
CA    civil affairs 
CAG    Civil Affairs Group 
CAO    civil affairs operations 
CD    counterdrug 
CINC    commander in chief 
CMO    civil military operations 
CP    counterproliferation 
CPP    Communist Party of the Philippines 
CRAT    combat readiness assessment and training 
CS    coalition support 
CSAR    combat search and rescue 
CT    counterterrorism 
C2    command and control 
DA    direct action 
DAO    direct action operations 
DC    dislocated civilian 
EPW/CI   enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee 
FHA    foreign humanitarian assistance 
FID    foreign internal defense 
FSRR    First Scout Ranger Regiment 
FRBn    Force Reconnaissance Battalion 
GHQAFP   General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines 
HALO    high-altitude low-opening 
HAHO    high-altitude high-opening 
HHC    headquarters and headquarters company 
HN    host nation 
HUK (HMB)   Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan 
IO    information operations 
ISO    internal security operations 
JFC    joint force commander 
JSOG    joint special operations group 
JTF    joint task force 
LRB    Light Reaction Battalion 
LRC    Light Reaction Company 
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MILF    Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
MOOTW   military operations other than war 
MOUT   military operations in urbanized terrain 
MTT    mobile training team 
NAVSOC   Naval special operations component 
NAVSPECWARCOM Naval Special Warfare Command 
NGO    non-government organization 
NPA    New People’s Army 
NDF    National Democratic Front 
NSW    Naval special warfare 
NSWG   Naval Special Warfare Group 
NSWU   Naval Special Warfare Unit 
PASOF   Philippine Army special operations forces 
PMC    Philippine Marine Corps 
PNP    Philippine National Police 
PSYOP   psychological operations 
SA    security assistance 
SBT    special boat team 
SDV    SEAL delivery vehicle 
SEAL    sea-air-land  
SF    special forces 
SFG(A)   Special Forces Group (Airborne) 
SFODA   special forces operational detachment “A” 
SFR(A)   Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) 
SOA    special operations aviation 
SOAR(A)   Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)  
SOF    special operations forces 
SOCOM   Special Operations Command 
SPOW    Special Operations Wing 
SR    scout ranger/special reconnaisance 
SRO    special reconnaissance operations 
SSD    strategic studies detachment 
STT    special tactics team 
SWCC    special warfare combatant-craft crewmen 
TDA    table of distribution and allowance 
UAR    unconventional assisted recovery 
USACAPOC United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations Command 
USAF United States Air Force 
USAR  United States Army Reserve  
USASFC  United States Army Special Forces Command 
USASOC   United States Army Special Operations Command 
USSOCOM   United States Special Operations Command 
UW    unconventional warfare 
WMD    weapons of mass destruction 
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